Managing diversity - what does it mean? : an analysis of different approaches and strategies by Pietschmann, Elena
19/2014Discussion Paper
Managing Diversity:
What Does it Mean?
Elena Pietschmann
An Analysis of Different Approaches
and Strategies
Managing diversity: what does it mean? 
An analysis of different approaches and strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elena Pietschmann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn 2014 
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ISSN 1860-0441 
 
 
 
 
Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; 
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed  
bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. 
 
ISBN 978-3-88985-639-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elena Pietschmann is a researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Ent-
wicklungspolitik (DIE), in the Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation Department. 
E-mail:  elena.pietschmann@die-gdi.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn 
 +49 (0)228 94927-0 
 +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de 
www.die-gdi.de  
Abstract 
An increasingly complex aid landscape makes it urgent to find ways for partner countries 
to manage the diversity of aid actors and channels. However, it remains unclear what 
‘managing diversity’ actually means and how this vague idea should be put into practice. 
This paper explores potential approaches and strategies. It defines ‘managing diversity’ as 
the management of different sources of aid by the partner country, aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of aid in a complex aid landscape. Different approaches to managing 
diversity are discussed and compared. Drawing on country experiences, the paper also 
analyses the role that contextual factors play in shaping incentives for the actors involved 
to implement different aid coordination strategies. Despite the multiplicity of possible 
strategies and approaches to managing diversity, some elements can be identified that will 
be crucial for every approach to aid coordination. To enhance their ability to effectively 
manage multiple actors and sources of development assistance, partner countries should 
develop clear aid policies and set up strong aid management institutions. Where needed, 
donors should support partner country leadership and capacity development in the area of 
effective aid management. 
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Summary 
The current development landscape is characterised by a multiplicity of different actors and 
aid channels, and it is largely believed that finding ways to deal with the proliferation of 
donors is crucial for improving aid effectiveness. However, despite repeated international 
commitments at High Level Forums in Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011) to 
tackle the challenges posed by a diverse aid landscape, progress to date has been rather slow. 
Besides lack of incentives for both donors and partner countries to rationalise aid portfolios, a 
major reason for the disappointing progress is uncertainty about what the most desirable type 
of aid landscape should look like. Efforts for reducing fragmentation have progressively 
shifted from a focus on decreasing the number of donors per partner country by means of 
cross-country division of labour (DoL) to in-country DoL and the ‘management of diversity’ 
at country level. However, it remains unclear what managing diversity actually means and 
how this vague idea should be put into practice. 
This paper defines managing diversity as the management of different sources and channels 
of aid by the partner country, aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid in a complex aid 
landscape. The activities for managing diversity do not necessarily result in a reduced number 
of donors, but in the long run they are all expected to reduce transaction costs and other 
undesirable consequences of a fragmented aid landscape. A broad range of options is 
envisaged, including pooling of aid, cross-sector DoL, joint strategies to achieve common 
objectives, sector working groups to enhance dialogue, etc. 
There is no single approach to managing diversity that both maximises the benefits and 
minimises the costs of strong donor coordination for partner countries. In particular, there 
seems to be a trade-off between minimising transaction costs and minimising the risks of 
reducing fragmentation in terms of a loss of bargaining power by the partner country 
government. The trade-off between having more choice and higher transaction costs is un-
avoidable and each country will need to make this cost-benefit analysis for itself. Partner 
countries’ strategies will also be shaped by contextual elements that determine their ability 
to take advantage of multiple aid sources, as well as the need to reduce transaction costs and 
the perceived risk of reducing the number of donors. Key contextual factors include the 
quality of partner country’s institutions; the degree of aid dependency; the structure of 
existing coordination mechanisms in the country; and the nature of the relationship between 
donors and partner country governments. 
Importantly, the choice of aid instruments also matters. Success in dealing with a multitude 
of donors might be related more to donors’ use of country systems than to the number of 
active donors per country or sector. Several countries that were relatively successful in 
managing diversity expressed a strong preference for budget support as a central piece of 
their strategies for better aid coordination. Partner countries could thus let donors distribute 
their aid in as many sectors as they wish and instead concentrate on their use of country 
systems. Also, they might decide to employ a combination of approaches in their efforts to 
manage diversity. Different approaches could be adopted for the different levels at which 
coordination can take place – i.e. the programming level, the implementation level, and the 
level of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
Despite the multiplicity of possible strategies and approaches to managing diversity, some 
elements can be identified that will be crucial for every approach to aid coordination. If 
managing diversity is defined as the management of aid from different sources by the 
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partner country, then partner country leadership in coordination efforts is essential, 
independent of the specific approach chosen. The establishment of clear priorities and 
strategies for aid coordination by the partner country government is a crucial success factor 
in managing diversity. 
Partner countries should develop detailed aid policies that lay out their preferences regarding 
donor coordination at the programming, implementation, and M&E levels. A comprehensive 
aid policy should define the sectoral and thematic priorities to be addressed by donors, the 
form and structure of coordination mechanisms and forums, the preferences in terms of aid 
modalities, and the use of country systems including a clear position on technical cooperation 
and the use of project implementation units (PIUs), and the extent to which the partner 
government wishes to take part in M&E activities. Aid policies should also clarify the extent 
to which partner countries wish to include new donors in coordination efforts. 
To ensure the implementation of aid policies, effective aid management institutions need to 
be in place. These should be located within an institution in charge of central coordination, 
such as the Ministry of Finance. It is crucial that aid management institutions are well 
connected to the rest of the government and spread awareness of the importance of aid 
coordination among line ministries. An important condition for aid management institutions 
to work effectively is the availability of reliable data on aid activities. In order to make 
efficient use of information on aid, partner countries should set up or strengthen aid 
information management systems (AIMS). 
The management of diversity should lie primarily in the hands of partner countries. However, 
success in coordinating aid also requires an active contribution by development partners. An 
effective management of aid will be impossible without donors’ readiness to conform to 
partner countries’ priorities and aid policies. Given the wide range of possible strategies for 
managing diversity, the actions required from donors will vary from country to country 
depending on the approach chosen by the partner government. However, independently of the 
specific approach chosen, donors can always support both the willingness and the capacity of 
partner countries to manage diversity. Partner countries’ willingness to take the lead in 
coordination efforts is often undermined by the fear of losing funding and by the perception 
that coordinated donors might exercise excessive influence on domestic policies. Donors can 
address the first concern by underlining their commitment to the principle set in the Accra 
Agenda for Action (Paragraph17a) that DoL and other coordination processes will have no 
impact on the overall aid volumes of individual countries. Addressing the fear that 
coordination might reduce partner countries’ bargaining power and undermine their 
ownership is more challenging. Here, reinforcing the link between coordination and 
alignment could be helpful. Donors should also support partner governments’ capacity 
development in the area of aid management by assisting in the creation and the strengthening 
of aid management institutions. Donor agencies can also facilitate the work of these 
institutions in two important ways: first, by minimising and harmonising the number of 
reports, assessments, and other project rules and requirements; second, by making 
information on their aid activities available timely and feeding it into the countries’ AIMS. 
Besides these crucial activities to be undertaken on both sides, there are also joint tasks for 
donors and partner countries: these include improving the conditions for dialogue between 
donors and partner countries; establishing strong mutual accountability mechanisms to 
ensure the implementation of coordination commitments; and promoting policy discussion 
on fragmentation and managing diversity at the regional and international level. 
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1 Introduction 
The current development landscape is characterised by a multiplicity of different actors and 
it is largely believed that finding ways to deal with the proliferation of donors is crucial for 
improving aid effectiveness (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011; Bigsten / Tengstam 2012; 
Knack / Smets 2012; Anderson 2012, 2; EC 2014, 15). With the increasing concentration of 
aid in least developed countries and fragile states (Sumner / Kanbur 2012) – precisely those 
which are least equipped for dealing with a fragmented aid landscape – finding ways to 
manage the multitude of development actors becomes even more important (Mackie 2013, 
16). However, despite repeated international commitments at the High Level Forums in 
Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011) to tackle the challenges posed by a diverse aid 
landscape, progress to date has been rather slow (Building Block on Managing Diversity 
and Reducing Fragmentation 2014a, 4). 
Besides a lack of incentives for both donors and partner countries to rationalise aid port-
folios, a major reason for the disappointing progress is uncertainty about what the most 
desirable type of aid landscape should look like. Academics and practitioners stress that 
better coordination would improve the developmental impact of aid, but it remains unclear 
what exactly the international community should aim for (Chandy / Kharas 2011, 742). 
Some argue that reducing the number of donors active in the same sector or country would 
go a long way towards increasing aid effectiveness (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 2011; 
Bigsten / Tengstam 2012; Knack / Smets 2012; Anderson 2012, 2). Others point out that 
there is also value in the multiplicity and diversity of actors and approaches to development 
(Brinkman 2013, 16; Severino / Ray 2009, 7). There is increasing agreement that there is no 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to managing diversity, and that the type and degree of coordina-
tion should be shaped by the country context (Dreher et al. 2013; Mackie 2013, 5; OECD 
2011b, 19; Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 94). However, it remains unclear what 
managing diversity actually means and how this vague idea should be put into practice. 
The present paper aims at filling this gap. In Sections 3 and 4, it proposes a definition of 
‘managing diversity’ and compares different approaches for its implementation. Drawing on 
country experiences, it also analyses the role contextual factors play in shaping incentives 
for the actors involved to implement different strategies for managing diversity. Following 
this, in Section 5, the paper identifies important activities that partner countries and donors 
should undertake to allow an efficient management of multiple aid actors and channels. The 
concluding sections, Section 6 and 7, draw attention to the most important requirements for 
managing diversity and formulate policy recommendations for both donors and partner 
countries. 
The analysis focuses on development aid at the country level. The presence of a large 
number of uncoordinated donors presents serious challenges for humanitarian aid as well 
(Vollmer 2012, 51–52; Darcy / Hofmann 2003, 10). However, humanitarian aid would 
require a separate analysis as it has its own distinct coordination structure and actors, 
notably the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
The discussion presented here is embedded in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
which is predominantly centred on development aid. Since most coordination efforts to date 
have been limited to DAC donors, the analysis predominantly focuses on these donors. 
However, opportunities for integrating non-DAC donors in different coordination 
approaches are also discussed in Section 4.3.3. Differences between multilateral and 
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bilateral donors are discussed not with reference to specific multilateral or bilateral actors 
but in the context of the comparison between different approaches to managing diversity, 
when analysing the properties of pooled aid as opposed to aid provided by bilateral sources. 
The paper is based on a review of papers and documents related to aid management and 
coordination. The desk research was complemented by interviews with donors – both at 
headquarters and at country offices – and with government officials working in the aid 
management units of various different partner countries. Field research was conducted in 
August 2013 in Bangladesh and Madagascar, and in December 2013 in Uganda. 
2 Background on fragmentation and managing diversity 
Aid fragmentation refers to the problem that individual donors tend to be engaged in too 
many countries, and spread their aid across too many sectors, which produces high 
transaction costs on both sides of the aid relationship (OECD 2011b, 3). Many official 
donors today give aid to more than a hundred countries (Frot 2009, 3) while emerging and 
private donors are increasingly engaging in development cooperation as well (Fengler / 
Kharas 2011, 6), resulting in a very fragmented aid landscape. The presence of a multitude 
of actors also undermines aid effectiveness in a number of other ways, such as by 
weakening partner countries’ institutions and blurring lines of accountability (Davies / 
Klasen 2013, 2–3). 
Increasing concerns over the negative impact of fragmentation on aid effectiveness have 
led donors to commit in a series of high-level international forums on aid effectiveness to 
rationalise the provision of development assistance. At both the Paris (2005) and the 
Accra (2008) High Level Forums, approaches for reducing fragmentation focused mostly 
on establishing a more effective division of labour (DoL) among donors, both at country 
and at sector level (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD), Paragraph 33–35; Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA), Paragraph 17). The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
for Action gave impetus to the DoL agenda especially at EU level, leading to the adoption 
of the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (CoC) in 2007 
(Keijzer / Corre 2009, 92).1 The CoC encourages EU donors to concentrate their aid on 
fewer partner countries by establishing priority countries for their bilateral aid 
programmes and specialising in three sectors. These commitments were reinforced by 
similar recommendations expressed in the OECD’s International Good Practice Principles 
for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity (OECD 2009). 
The implementation of DoL commitments, however, has proven extremely difficult, 
especially at cross-country level. Individual donors face strong incentives against con-
centrating their aid in fewer partner countries. Concerns about visibility towards domestic 
taxpayers, as well as political and commercial interests, make donors reluctant to exit 
                                                          
1  The principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence between the development activities of 
EU member states and the European Commission, as well as among member states, had already been 
established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. A number of initiatives to improve EU coordination in 
the field of development cooperation had already been undertaken in the years after 1992, but progress 
remained tentative. In the meantime, the country and sector portfolio of both the EU and of its member 
states kept expanding throughout the years between 1992 and 2007 (Keijzer / Corre 2009, 91). 
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countries where they have an established aid programme (Bigsten / Platteau / Tengstam 
2011, 152–153; Schulz 2007, 1; Odén / Wohlgemuth 2011; Chandy / Kharas 2011, 746; 
Rasmussen 2013, 42). Progress has been slow and is currently stalling (Brown / Swiss 
2013; EC 2011, 7; Mackie 2013, 15). Therefore, donors have started focusing 
predominantly on in-country coordination, perceived as politically less sensitive than 
cross-country DoL (Corre / Mackie / Trenner 2008, 22; Grimm / Schulz 2009; Mackie 
2013, 4–5). EU efforts to tackle fragmentation are now predominantly driven by the EU 
Joint Programming initiative2, which focuses on coordination within partner countries 
rather than a reduction in the number of donors per country (EC 2014, 15). 
Besides the political challenges met during the implementation of cross-country DoL, the 
shift in focus away from this approach to reducing fragmentation was influenced by the 
idea that there is value also in the multiplicity and the diversity of development actors. 
This argument is increasingly put forward both in academic papers (Severino / Ray 2009, 
7; Brinkman 2013, 16) and at policy level. In 2011, the Busan High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness introduced the concept of ‘managing diversity’. The Busan Partnership 
Document states that donors and partner countries:  
“Welcome the diversity of development cooperation actors. Developing countries will 
lead consultation and coordination efforts to manage this diversity at the country 
level” (Busan Partnership Document (BPd), Paragraph 25). 
The international working group launched in Busan in response to the problem of 
fragmentation was given the name “Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing 
Fragmentation”. 
Recently, the First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation in Mexico (April 2014) makes no reference in its final 
Communiqué to cross-country DoL. Regarding fragmentation, it states:  
“In accordance to the priorities and policies set out by recipient countries, we will 
continue avoiding aid fragmentation pursuing division of labor under country leader-
ship, strengthening joint programming […]. In this context, we encourage all pro-
viders of development assistance to actively support and participate in country-led 
coordination mechanisms” (Mexico High Level Meeting Communiqué Paragraph 10). 
Here DoL is envisaged as taking place under country leadership, indicating that reference 
is made to in-country DoL across sectors, not international DoL across partner countries. 
Despite the emphasis on ‘managing diversity’, it remains unclear what exactly is meant by 
the term, and how the management of diversity should be implemented. The Paris Decla-
ration underlines the importance of improving coordination, but provides little guidance 
on how this should be done at the country level (Linn 2009, 1). The following sections 
propose a definition for the term, and discuss different implementation approaches. 
                                                          
2  Joint Programming is a European initiative aimed at increasing aid effectiveness, whereby the EU and 
its member states elaborate a Joint Strategy based on the national development strategy of each partner 
country which includes a joint analysis of the partner country, identifies priority areas for support, and 
agrees on which donor should work in which sector. Joint Programming still faces important 
challenges, but the process is advancing in about 40 partner countries (EC 2014, 7). 
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3 What is managing diversity? Definition and possible approaches  
This paper defines ‘managing diversity’ as the management of different sources of aid by 
the partner country, aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid in a complex aid landscape. 
While suggestions for improvements in coordination tend to be focused on relations and 
negotiations among donors (Woods 2011, 13–14), emphasising the partner country’s 
perspective is in line with the principles of aid effectiveness, as the importance of partner 
country leadership in coordination efforts has been underlined in all the international High 
Level Forums and is the first of the International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led 
Division of Labour and Complementarity (OECD 2009). Moreover, although still weak, 
incentives for increasing coordination are likely to be stronger on the partner country than 
on the donor side (Woods 2011, 13–14). Adverse incentives hinder coordination efforts on 
the donors’ side. Concerns about visibility and accountability to domestic taxpayers, as well 
as vested interests, make donors reluctant to release control over their funding. Lack of trust 
among donors and technical difficulties constitute serious additional obstacles (Schulz 2007, 
1; Odén / Wohlgemuth 2011; Leiderer 2013, 33–34; Chandy / Kharas 2011, 746; 
Rasmussen 2013, 42; Carbone 2012, 9–10; Lawson 2013, 18; Rasmussen 2013, 42; Wentzel 
2011, 9). Taking incentives into account is crucial because lack of incentives to implement 
coordination commitments constitutes the main obstacle for progress (Leiderer 2013, 34). 
The activities for managing diversity do not necessarily result in a reduced number of 
donors, but they are all expected to reduce transaction costs and other undesirable 
consequences of a fragmented aid landscape, such as collective action problems, inefficien-
cies in aid allocation, and the overlap of contrasting approaches and strategies. A broad 
range of options is envisaged, including pooling of aid, cross-sector DoL, joint strategies to 
achieve common objectives, sector working groups to enhance dialogue, use of country 
systems, etc. (Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation 2014a, 
6; DFID 2010, 1). 
To assess the several possible ways in which developing countries can deal with the 
complexity of the current aid landscape, it is helpful to analyse existing tools in a systematic 
way. Mechanisms for country-level coordination can be classified according to different 
criteria. Mackie (2013, 4–5) identifies different approaches according to the extent to which 
they would produce a reduction in the number of donors (pooling of resources; cross-sector 
DoL; coordination and complementarity). On the other hand, Klingebiel, Morazán, and 
Negre (2013, 23) distinguish between the different levels at which coordination can take 
place (the policy, the programming, and the implementation level). Because the problem of 
fragmentation is closely related to the presence of a large number of donors, this paper will 
first apply Mackie’s classification and analyse the advantages and disadvantages of reducing 
the number of donors. Such an analysis shows that there is no ‘ideal’ number of donors, and 
that there are trade-offs between the costs and benefits of differing approaches. Given this 
conclusion, Section 4.7 makes reference to the classification by Klingebiel, Morazán, and 
Negre (2013, 23), as it is particularly useful for highlighting the possibility for partner 
countries to use different approaches to managing diversity in different phases of 
development cooperation. 
Following Mackie’s classification, three main approaches for managing diversity can be 
identified: 
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a. Pooling of resources: Partner countries could invite donors to pool resources and channel 
them through multilateral vehicles of some form – multilateral organisations, trust funds, co-
financing arrangements among bilateral donors such as the Mutual Reliance Initiative 
(MRI)3, or through the partner country’s institutions in the form of multi-donor budget 
support (MDBS)4. Depending on donors’ trust in the partner government, pooling 
arrangements can be run by the government, by the donors, or jointly (Klingebiel / Morazán 
/ Negre 2013, 81). In its extreme form, pooling would have one single multilateral orga-
nisation as the only donor to the country. The extent to which the pooling approach is 
currently adopted varies from country to country but in general it is not particularly large. 
There appears to be a slowing down of multilateral aid since 2009, when its share decreased 
to 28% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) from a peak of 33% in 2001 
(OECD 2011a, 5). Donors tend to use multilateral aid mechanisms to supplement, rather 
than replace, bilateral aid (Lawson 2013, 17). However, earmarked funding (i.e. aid that 
bilateral donors allocate to specific projects implemented by multilateral institutions), and in 
particular the use of multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)5, has seen a substantial increase in 
recent times. In 2010, 12% of total ODA, though counted as bilateral, was channelled 
through and implemented by multilateral agencies (OECD 2011a, 5). Some movement in 
the direction of pooling can also be observed among EU donors: 25% of collective EU ODA 
is now administered through a central institution, the European Commission (Mackie 2013). 
b. Cross-sector division of labour: The DoL approach envisages a coordinated distribution 
of donors across sectors, with individual donors concentrating aid in a limited number of 
thematic areas. Partner countries could encourage donors to focus on areas where they have 
a comparative advantage, while allowing them to contribute to other sectors through 
delegated cooperation.6 Actual progress on in-country DoL dwindled after having peaked in 
2009 (EC 2011, 7; Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Thiele 2011; Bürcky 2011). However, the DoL 
agenda has recently been pushed forward by the current momentum in EU Joint Program-
ming (EC 2014, 15). 
                                                          
3  For example, the French aid agency Agence Française de Développement (AfD), the German 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW, the KfW Development Bank), and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) recently signed an MRI for the joint funding of a common programme which will be 
implemented by one of the agencies taking the role of ‘lead donor’ (see: http://www.eib.org/infocentre 
/events/all/the-mri-effective-partnering-for-growth-development.htm?lang=de). 
4  Budget support can be provided in various different forms: as general or sector budget support, in fixed 
or variable tranches, or in combinations thereof. Despite these variations, MDBS asserted itself as the 
most common modality in most least developed countries where budget support is provided by several 
donors. Generally, dedicated budget support donor groups are established to coordinate the policy 
dialogue between the partner government and donors and discuss the conditions that need to be in place 
for the disbursement of funds. MDBS groups are usually chaired by one or more donors and offer a 
framework for donor coordination which has high potential for a reduction of transaction costs and 
other disadvantages of fragmentation (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 46). 
5  Bilateral donors increasingly provide aid to fragile states through MDTFs that collect contributions 
from many donors and administer them under a single governance structure, generally managed by 
multilateral donors such as the World Bank (Barakat / Rzeszut / Martin 2012, 10). MDTFs serve both 
as a joint funding modality and a coordination framework (DFID 2010, 5–6). 
6  Delegated cooperation, also known as ‘silent partnership’, allows bilateral donors to support sectors 
where they do not have a presence by channelling aid though another bilateral donor active in that area 
(NORAD 2006). Only 9 of the 21 countries involved in the fast-track DoL initiative have used this 
instrument (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013). 
Elena Pietschmann 
8 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
c. Coordination through communication7: Following this approach, partner countries would 
not ask individual donors to concentrate aid, but would strengthen coordination with and 
among the multiple donors through donor consultative groups, sector working groups, and 
other coordination mechanisms at the national or sector level. To date, forums for dialogue 
between partner country governments and donors, as well as among donors, have been set 
up in most partner countries (UNDP 2011). However, such mechanisms are predominantly 
used for information exchange on ongoing development projects and programmes, whereas 
a full implementation of the ‘coordination through communication’ approach would require 
ex-ante coordination of individual donors’ activities to prevent the duplication of efforts and 
other undesirable consequences of fragmentation (Woods 2011, 10). Figure 1 illustrates 
these three different approaches to managing diversity: 
Figure 1: Approaches and instruments for managing diversity of aid sources and channels by 
partner countries 
 
Source: Own compilation based on Mackie 2013 
In practice, the distinction between these three different approaches is not straightforward, 
because in most partner countries elements of all three can be observed. This is sometimes 
the result of donors’ actions and of the lack of a clear strategy by the partner country, and 
sometimes it corresponds to a strategy adopted by the partner country to combine different 
approaches (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 20–21). 
                                                          
7  Mackie (2013, 4–5), calls this third approach “coordination and complementarity”. Here, I prefer 
referring to it as ‘coordination through communication’, because all of the three approaches outlined 
can be seen as forms of coordination, and because DoL also implies complementarity. 
Managing diversity
Pooling of resources Cross-sector division of 
labour (DoL)
Coordination through
communication
Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)
Basket funds
Multi-donor budget support 
(MDBS)
Mutual reliance initiatives (MRIs)
Other co-financing arrangements
Cross-sector DoL frameworks
EU Joint Programming
Delegated cooperation
Different types of forums for 
dialogue and coordination 
(e.g. consultative groups at the 
national and sector levels)
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Importantly, the choice of aid instruments also matters. Aid modalities have primarily 
been distinguished according to the technical arrangements governing the disbursement 
and the management of funds. These include: i) type and terms of finance; ii) 
disbursement channels; iii) procurement conditions; and iv) targeting and tracking of 
donor resources. Programme-based approaches (PBAs)8 can be implemented through 
different aid instruments including budget support (BS), basket funds, and sector-wide 
approaches (SWAPs)9. Because they include pooling of resources, DoL, and coordination 
through communication, PBAs have elements of all the approaches in Figure 1. PBAs aim 
at reducing transaction costs and other problems of fragmentation not only by increasing 
donor harmonisation but also by making greater use of country systems. In fact, success in 
dealing with a multitude of donors might be related more to donors’ use of country 
systems than to the number of active donors per country or sector (Klingebiel 2013, 6). 
These essential points are discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
4 Comparison of different approaches 
It is very difficult to give an assessment of different approaches to managing diversity 
which is independent of context. Empirically, the evidence does not offer general answers 
on the advantages or disadvantages of reducing the number of donors or aid channels, as 
these will largely depend on the context (Dreher et al. 2013). Such inconclusiveness is 
also due to the fact that some of the costs and benefits of having a large number of donors 
are very hard to measure (Lawson 2009, 13; Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson, 2009, 10). 
Also, coordination efforts are relatively recent while their costs and benefits are likely to 
only become visible in the medium to long term (Wentzel 2011, 12–15). Conceptually, 
both costs and benefits can be associated with reducing the number of donors, and trade-
offs exist between the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches, as will 
become clear in the following sections. However, it is possible to identify the costs and 
benefits of different approaches, and partner countries can subsequently weigh up these 
costs and benefits in order to design the most suitable strategy for managing diversity in 
their particular context. 
The literature on fragmentation identifies a number of benefits and costs associated with 
strengthening coordination. Main advantages include: 
                                                          
8 According to the OECD DAC definition, PBAs are a coordinated support for a locally owned 
development programme such as a national development strategy or sector and thematic programmes. 
PBAs should: i) be led by the partner country; ii) have a single comprehensive programme and budget 
framework; iii) include a harmonisation of donor reporting, budgeting, financial management and 
procurement; iv) make increased use of country systems for programme design and implementation, 
financial management, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Implementation of PBAs can take place 
through different aid instruments ranging from basket funding of specific activities or reform 
programmes to joint support of SWAPs and sector and general budget support. PBAs are expected to 
reduce transaction costs through harmonisation and strengthened country ownership through the use of 
country systems (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 44–45). 
9 SWAPs are approaches that operate following the principles of PBAs but are focused on one specific 
sector or thematic area, such as health or governance (Klingebiel / Leiderer / Schmidt 2007, 5). 
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Reduced transaction costs10: This is the most commonly cited benefit of reducing 
fragmentation, and refers to savings in resources spent on meetings, missions, 
negotiations, monitoring, reports, etc. Transaction costs can be reduced for partner 
countries, for donors, or for both. Reducing transaction costs for partner country 
governments is particularly important because it promotes the strengthening of 
government capacity (ODI 2005, 26). Indeed, if government officials are constantly busy 
dealing with donors they will not be able to attend their core business (Klingebiel / 
Morazán / Negre 2013, 13). However, inefficient coordination mechanisms can also 
produce an increase in transaction costs (DFID 2010, 5). 
More efficient aid allocation: A second, frequently mentioned problem associated with a 
fragmented development landscape is that many uncoordinated donors tend to focus on 
the same sectors, sub-sectors and geographical areas, producing a duplication of efforts on 
the one hand and funding gaps on the other (Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson 2009, 29). 
Coordination helps to achieve an efficient overall aid allocation that addresses the partner 
country’s main development priorities and is therefore better aligned (Klingebiel / 
Morazán / Negre 2013, 13). 
More coherent approaches and strategies: Fragmentation produces a multiplication of 
different and sometimes contradictory strategies and approaches to development (Carlsson 
/ Schubert / Robinson 2009, 29). Aid can be ineffective or even harmful if farmers, 
election officials, or health providers receive contradictory guidance from technical 
advisors provided by different donors (Lawson 2013, 4). Government actors exposed to 
contradictory signals from different donors experience difficulties in prioritising their 
actions (ODI 2005, 32). 
Reduced collective action problems: Fragmentation tends to produce collective action 
problems that arise when actors do not take part in efforts whose benefits will be shared 
by all, leading to outcomes that are sub-optimal for everyone involved. Because 
development in the partner country is a good shared by all donors, the presence of many 
donors lets individual actors free-ride on other donors’ efforts (Olson 1965). With a large 
number of actors, responsibility for the development impact of aid is diffused and 
individual donors will tend to concentrate on the success of their own projects to the 
detriment of the overall effectiveness of aid (Bigsten 2006, 4; Acharya / De Lima / Moore 
2004, 8; Williamson 2010, 22). Collective action problems also induce uncoordinated 
donors to compete for the most capable staff, and aid agencies’ ‘poaching of officials’ 
often leads to the weakening of government institutions (Knack / Rahman 2008). 
On the other hand, strong donor coordination might also carry disadvantages for the 
partner country, such as: 
                                                          
10  Aid transaction costs are the costs which allow an aid transaction to take place but which add nothing 
to the actual value of that transaction. According to Lawson (2009, 10), transaction costs can be 
divided in three categories: a. Search costs: the costs necessary for partner country governments and 
potential donors to identify appropriate development partners, projects or programmes; b. bargaining 
and decision costs: the costs of negotiating and agreeing financing agreements for projects and other 
operations; c. Policing and enforcement costs: the costs to partner country governments of fulfilling 
requirements for project execution and monitoring and to donor agencies of supervising adherence to 
project and programme conditions and of undertaking corrective actions where necessary. All these 
costs tend to increase in the presence of many uncoordinated donors. 
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Loss of partner-country ownership: For the partner country, it is often not obvious that 
increased coordination among donors will lead to better alignment to the country’s needs 
(Bigsten 2006, 15; UNDP 2011, 7). On the contrary, it could lead to a “donor cartel” that 
imposes its own preferences and conditions (Rocha Menocal / Rogerson 2006, 9). While 
donors consider a more effective use of conditionalities one of the advantages of stronger 
coordination (Bigsten / Tengstam 2012, 3), partner countries do not see it as a desirable 
outcome of reducing fragmentation. If donor coordination leads to a unified position 
among the whole donor group, this might undermine the partner-country’s room for 
manoeuvre in the choice of policies (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 14; UN 2011, 28; 
Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010; OECD 2011b). This is part of the reason why some 
partner governments find the idea of donor coordination threatening and prefer to deal 
with donors individually – whatever the transaction costs (DFID 2010, 2). The link 
between coordination on the one hand and ownership and alignment on the other was 
emphasised in the Accra Agenda for Action (Woods 2011, 14) and the Busan Partnership 
document, which both stress that aid coordination should be led by the partner country. 
However, there are some unresolved trade-offs between those concepts (Booth 2011, 5). 
Tied aid: Reducing fragmentation might impact negatively on the quality of aid provided. 
Concerns have been expressed about the fact that in a less fragmented aid landscape 
donors might gain monopoly power and be in a position to deliver prevalently tied aid11 
(UN 2011, 28; Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010; OECD 2011b)12. 
Loss of donor expertise: One cost commonly associated with reducing fragmentation is 
the loss of donor expertise produced by a donor’s exit from a country or a sector 
(Rogerson 2005, 543). In contrast, reducing fragmentation might strengthen the partner 
country’s national expertise if it allows the poaching of officials by multiple development 
agencies competing for staff to be limited. In this paper, the sections focusing on the loss 
of expertise refer to donor expertise, since the effects of reducing fragmentation on 
national expertise are covered in the sections that concentrate on reduced poaching of 
officials and the use of country systems. 
Some of the benefits and costs outlined above are related to the strengthening of 
coordination among donors, while others are due to a reduction in the number of donors. 
This important difference will become clearer in the following sections which analyse the 
presence of such advantages and disadvantages in the various different approaches to 
managing diversity. 
                                                          
11  ‘Tied aid’ is defined as development assistance provided under the condition that certain goods and 
services are purchased from firms in the donor country, or otherwise directly involve donor country 
stakeholders. Donors often justify the tying of aid by stating that it increases taxpayers’ support for 
development assistance. The tying of aid reduces the effectiveness of development cooperation by 
placing purchasing decisions in the hands of development partners and thereby reducing ownership; by 
increasing the costs of supply; and by reducing aid’s potential to boost the local economy (Keijzer 
2013, 24). 
12  The evidence however is not uncontroversial: Knack and Smets (2012) find that lower numbers of 
donors are instead associated with less aid tying. 
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4.1 Pooling of resources 
4.1.1 Advantages of coordination in the pooling approach 
Reduced transaction costs: Among the different approaches to managing diversity, 
pooling has the greatest potential for reducing transaction costs. The programming, 
design, and supervision of aid activities could in principle be carried out by one agency on 
behalf of several donors (Lawson 2009, 13). With pooled funding, transaction costs are 
expected to be very low on the partner country side, as partner governments would not 
have to negotiate with each donor bilaterally any more. Donors would also see a 
substantial reduction in operational transaction costs (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 
124). Reducing transaction costs is one of the reasons why multilateral organisations such 
as the World Bank and UN agencies were conceived (Lawson 2013, 9; Abbott / Snidal 
1998, 4–5). Some argue that donors should focus not on harmonisation, but on the 
multilateralisation of aid instead (Woods 2011, 8; Manning 2012, 11). Joint funding 
arrangements among bilateral donors can also be expected to carry a reduction in 
transaction costs. Budget support (BS) is another form of pooled funding, and this is why 
it brings with it many of the advantages of pooling (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 
48). It can be argued that delivering aid through partner country governments in the form 
of direct BS is the most effective way to harmonisation (Lawson 2013, 16). 
Efficient aid allocation: In terms of efficient allocation of resources, a pooling approach 
would be particularly helpful, as centralisation enables a better overview of aid activities 
and the avoidance of gaps in coverage (Abbott / Snidal 1998, 13–14). Moreover, pooling 
mitigates bilateral donors’ risk-aversion and their tendency to avoid allocating aid to 
projects that present larger risks (Klingebiel 2013, 6). Finally, pooling creates economies 
of scale that allow financing energy and infrastructure projects that would be too large for 
individual bilateral donors (Lawson 2013, 4). 
Improved coherence of strategies: Pooling would also be helpful for avoiding the 
coexistence of contrasting strategies and approaches to development. According to the 
DAC (2001, 16), incoherent strategies and preferences among donors arise for three 
reasons: differing analysis; differing mandates; and differing domestic pressures. While 
the first source of discrepancy could be avoided by recurring to joint analyses, which is 
compatible with all three approaches to managing diversity, the second and third sources 
of discrepancy are best addressed through pooling. 
Reduced collective action problems: Pooling would also help mitigate collective action 
problems by reducing the number of donors, which is expected to promote burden-sharing 
in providing collective goods because it makes free-riding more difficult (Abbott / Snidal 
1998, 12). If provided through multilateral organisations, pooled aid would have the 
additional advantage that multilateral institutions tend to be less competitive and readier to 
coordinate than bilateral donors, thereby making common efforts easier (Abbott / Snidal 
1998, 12; Öhler 2013, 17). This advantage however seems to be weakened in the case of 
trust funds and other entities financed by earmarked contributions, because they often 
carry the particular wishes of each bilateral donor in the form of conditions applied to the 
use of funds (Powell / Bobba 2006, 7). 
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4.1.2 Disadvantages of coordination in the pooling approach 
While it has large potential for reaping the benefits of reducing fragmentation, pooling also 
carries many of the risks associated with it. 
Reduced country ownership: From the perspective of country ownership, pooling seems 
the most risky option. The presence of a dominant donor might undermine ownership 
because such donors tend to take over state operations (ODI 2005, 41) and because 
dependency on one donor will provide it with excessive influence on the partner country’s 
policies (Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010; OECD 2011b). However, multilateral aid 
generally leaves less scope for individual donor countries to pursue their own interests, 
making this kind of aid less politicised and interest-based than bilateral aid. As a result, 
multilateral aid can facilitate greater ownership by partner countries (Klingebiel 2013, 5–
6; Powell / Bobba 2006, 21). Multilateral organisations also tend to provide less tied aid 
than bilateral donors (Jepma 1991; Kanbur 2000; 2006). 
Loss of donor expertise: The pooling approach is likely to produce the largest loss of 
expertise, as it would generally require bilateral donors to exit. Limiting the variety of 
independent donors might also undermine the promotion of pluralism, creativity and 
innovation (Lawson 2013, 5; Severino / Ray 2009, 7; Brinkman 2013, 16). On the other 
hand, it can also be argued (Abbott / Snidal 1998, 13–14) that due to the large number of 
activities they carry out in many sectors and countries, large multilateral organisations are 
better placed than bilateral donors to accumulate knowledge and develop expertise. In 
contrast, many co-existing donors might fail to develop collective learning, with one 
donor’s mistakes being subsequently repeated by others (Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson 
2009, 29; Brown et al. 2000). 
4.2 Division of labour (DoL) 
4.2.1 Advantages of coordination in the DoL approach 
Reduced transaction costs: While a DoL approach might carry larger transaction costs 
than pooling, at the bottom line it is still expected to have lower transaction costs as 
compared to coordination through communication. Indeed, partner countries would have 
to deal with fewer donors per sector, and donors active in only a couple of sectors would 
be able to reduce operational costs as well (Weingärtner 2008, 23). However, a reduction 
in transaction costs is likely to occur in the medium to long term rather than in the short 
term. The three monitoring reports of the EU Fast-Track Initiative on DoL assess that 
transaction costs have increased for both partner countries and donors as a result of an 
increased number of donor meetings (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 37). Delegated 
cooperation might still involve transaction costs for both donors and partner countries 
because delegated cooperation arrangements have to be prepared and negotiated between 
donors and with the partner government (NORAD 2006, 12–14). However, once 
arrangements have been negotiated they are expected to reduce transaction costs for the 
partner country, as the delegating donor is supposed to remain silent in relation to the 
partner government (ibid., 21). In general, transaction costs from DoL tend to rise during 
an initial phase as the framework is set up, and then to decrease in a second phase 
(Weingärtner 2008, 18–19; Wentzel 2011, 12–15). 
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Efficient aid allocation: DoL also has the potential to improve the overall allocation of aid 
(Weingärtner 2008, 23). A more rational distribution of donors across sectors would avoid 
the emergence of ‘darling’ and ‘orphan’ sectors (Pietschmann 2014, 91). By concentrating 
on their areas of competitive advantage, donors could also fund fewer but larger projects 
than if they were involved in more sectors, thereby enhancing their leverage (Rogerson 
2005, 543). However, DoL entails the risk of producing funding gaps in cross-cutting 
issues that span sectors led by different donors (Government of Malawi 2010, 32–33; 
Weingärtner 2008, 19). 
Reduced collective action problems: DoL leads to a reduction in the number of donors per 
sector, which is likely to reduce collective action problems by making it harder for donors 
to free-ride (Abbott / Snidal 1998, 12). However, it also decreases competition among 
providers of development assistance, thereby increasing their ability to deliver tied aid 
(UN 2011, 28; Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010). In the case of DoL, the risk would be 
greater than with the pooling option because bilateral donors tend to have a more 
pronounced tendency to promote their national commercial interests by tying aid (Jepma 
1991; Kanbur 2000; 2006). 
4.2.2 Disadvantages of coordination in the DoL approach  
Reduced country ownership: Concerning ownership, with DoL the problem lies 
predominantly at the sector level, as limited numbers of donors per sector make it more 
difficult for the government to play one donor off against another and have its own way in 
sector policies. Moreover, the presence of strong lead donors may also crowd out 
emerging policy leadership from the partner country government in the relevant sectors 
(ODI 2005, 41). Combined with the fear of losing funding as a result of a reduction in the 
number of donors per sector, concerns over ownership often make partner country 
governments reluctant towards DoL (Brinkman 2013, 15–16). 
Loss of donor expertise: It is likely that some expertise will get lost as donors exit sectors 
where they have been active for many years. This is particularly true for large donors who 
have typically developed expertise in many sectors (Mackie 2013, 16). However, 
concentrating on fewer sectors can also be seen as an opportunity for donors to develop 
even greater expertise in their areas of comparative advantage (Mürle 2007, 36). 
4.3 Coordination through communication  
4.3.1 Advantages of coordination in the ‘coordination through communication’ 
approach  
Reduced transaction costs: Coordination through communication accepts the presence of 
many donors active in multiple sectors and is thus likely to present the largest transaction 
costs both for donors and for partner countries (Easterly / Williamson 2011). With this 
approach, transaction costs are likely to be reduced for the partner country government 
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(Linn 2009, 15), although this is not always the case (DFID 2010, 5).13 For donors the 
transaction costs might actually even increase with coordination through communication 
as compared to non-coordination because they not only have to negotiate with the partner 
government, but also with all other donors in all sectors (Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson 
2009, 47; Bürcky 2011, 7–8)14. Coordination through communication thus appears to be 
the least suitable option for reducing transaction costs because coordinating large numbers 
of donors active in many areas also produces transaction costs (Wood et al. 2011, 27). 
Efficient aid allocation: Because it does not involve the redistribution of donors across 
sectors, coordination through communication appears to be also less suited for avoiding 
the emergence of under-assisted and overcrowded sectors. The problem of inefficient 
allocations can in theory be also solved by a ‘coordination through communication’ 
approach by means of increased exchange of information, which would allow donors to 
adjust their allocations to a certain sector based on other donors’ allocations to that sector 
(Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004). Increased exchange of information among donors active in 
the same sector might also help to improve allocative efficiency at the sub-sectoral level 
and may result in something similar to an informal DoL across sub-sectors. However, with 
a larger number of donors involved, such allocation decisions would require more 
negotiations and coordination meetings as compared to pooling or DoL, thereby 
increasing transaction costs and delays (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 14). Delays in 
disbursements could be counterproductive especially in fragile or post-conflict situations 
that often demand immediate action and the quick delivery of tangible results (Klingebiel / 
Morazán / Negre 2013, 14).15 Despite its not being included in the aid-effectiveness 
agenda, speed of disbursement was identified as a key priority for partner countries 
(Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 27). 
Improved coherence of strategies: Coordination through communication would not 
eliminate the existence of many different and potentially contradictory strategies for 
development. However, exchange of information among donors can at least help to avoid 
the same groups being targeted with incompatible strategies (Lawson 2013, 4). This would 
allow the coexistence of different strategies, which can promote pluralism, creativity and 
innovation (Lawson 2013, 5; Severino / Ray 2009, 7; Brinkman 2013, 16). 
Reduced collective action problems: While some of the benefits of coordination identified 
above could be achieved with all three approaches – albeit with rising transaction costs 
from pooling to coordination – it will be harder to solve collective action problems in 
                                                          
13  For instance, the coordination mechanism initiated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was 
successful in bringing 17 donors together under one framework, but this also meant that the planning 
processes became very transaction intensive, and, for the partner country, transaction costs probably 
increased (DFID 2010, 5). 
14  Even if donors were to incur higher transaction costs than with no coordination, coordination through 
communication might still increase the development impact of aid if it reduces transaction costs for the 
partner government. It can be argued that receiving governments, who already suffer from capacity 
constraints in the normal business of government, should carry less of the burden of aid transaction 
costs than donors whose capacity to absorb those costs is greater (Lawson 2009, 19). 
15  While the problem seems to be particularly serious with a ‘coordination through communication’ 
approach, lengthy procedures are associated with other coordination modalities too. Joint pooled 
funding mechanisms have also been criticised for not being flexible enough to be able to disburse funds 
rapidly in critical situations (Hoyos / Muggah 2009, 56). 
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ways other than by reducing the number of actors. Coordination through communication 
can mitigate those types of collective action problems that arise from lack of information 
(Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004), but does not necessarily limit civil servant poaching or the 
diffusion of responsibility. 
4.3.2 Disadvantages of coordination in the ‘coordination through communication’ 
approach  
Reduced country ownership: With a ‘coordination through communication’ approach the 
risk of weakening ownership is reduced, as the presence of many donors increases the 
partner government’s bargaining power and its ability to approach other donors if one does 
not meet its needs or terms (Gibson et al. 2005, 65). However, coordination through 
communication can also undermine government ownership if it comes with long 
negotiations that distract attention and energy away from the government processes of 
priority-setting, implementation, and monitoring (Odén / Wohlgemuth 2011, 7). There is a 
risk that the focus shifts to inter-donor relations and negotiations and that during 
coordination meetings the country’s representatives sit watching donors argue (Woods 
2011, 13). 
Tied aid: In terms of avoiding the risk of tied aid, coordination through communication 
seems to be the best option, since a large number of donors per sector will help to 
maintain competition among them (UN 2011, 28; Rogerson 2005; Frot / Santiso 2010). 
The tying of aid might even be reduced as compared to a situation of no coordination due 
to the increased peer-pressure that coordinated donors may exercise on each other to 
deliver aid in line with the Paris Declaration. 
Loss of donor expertise: Similarly, expertise will not get lost with the ‘coordination 
through communication’ approach as donors are not required to exit any sector, and it 
might even be strengthened thanks to an increased exchange of information and the 
sharing of different experiences among donors and the partner government within the 
framework of sector working groups or other forums for dialogue. 
4.3.3 Opportunities for coordination with non-DAC donors in the different 
approaches 
One of the factors leading to an increasingly diverse and fragmented landscape is the 
growing role of non-DAC donors16 (Kharas / Rogerson 2012, 14). The emergence of new 
donors increases the fragmentation and complexity of the development landscape, thereby 
worsening transaction costs (Fengler / Kharas 2011). The presence of non-DAC donors is 
an often-mentioned challenge when it comes to managing diversity, as these donors are 
reluctant to be integrated into coordination efforts (Öhler 2013, 17; Chigunta / Matshalaga 
                                                          
16  It is estimated that new donors such as China, India and Brazil provide around US$ 15 billion worth of 
aid yearly, and that this flow could grow to more than US$ 50 billion by 2025 (Kharas / Rogerson 
2012, 14). 
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2010, 13; EC 2011, 2). An important question to ask is therefore which approach would be 
best suited for integrating these donors into coordination processes. 
In general, when it comes to managing diversity, China and other important new donors 
are not eager to participate in what they perceive as an OECD-led process (Kragelund 
2008, 580; Xu 2012, 2; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 30). Pooling does not seem 
to be a likely option: although new donors are increasingly contributing to multilateral 
agencies (OECD 2011a, 6; OECD 2012b, 17), they still strongly prefer to channel aid 
through their bilateral programmes (Xu 2012, 2). However, the presence of donors that do 
not pool funds can also be seen as something that would decrease the risk that pooling 
might lead to a monopolistic aid landscape (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 15–16). 
Partner countries might be less reluctant towards pooling by DAC donors if the presence 
of non-DAC donors gives them alternative partners to address. 
Attempts by DAC donors to involve non-DAC bilateral donors in the negotiation process 
of DoL frameworks have largely been unsuccessful (Nunnenkamp / Öhler / Thiele 2011, 
13; Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 37; Weingärtner 2008, 24). At the same time, 
some sort of ‘natural’ DoL has emerged, as new donors tend to focus on the productive 
sectors while DAC donors currently prefer the social ones (Woods 2011, 12; Linn 2009, 8; 
Wentzel 2011, 15; Carbone 2012, 11; Berthélemy 2009, 15; Burnet 2011, 181). 
For the moment, a ‘coordination through communication’ approach that focuses on 
improving the exchange of information among DAC and non-DAC donors seems the most 
feasible approach. Even achieving this less ambitious goal has the potential to improve aid 
coordination, as information on aid activities by non-DAC donors is still very scarce 
(Sinha / Hubbard 2012; Grimm et al. 2011). 
However, for many partner countries, including non-DAC donors in coordination 
approaches does not seem to be a priority. Countries where emerging donors make up a 
relatively large share of ODA often see a strengthening in their bargaining power towards 
DAC donors (Gore 2013, 777). Therefore, partner countries often show a preference for 
keeping DAC and non-DAC donors separate (Gore 2013, 777; Walshe Roussel 2013; 
Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013). According to Greenhill, Prizzon and Rogerson 
(2013, 27), emerging donors fare relatively well in terms of alignment to partner 
governments’ development priorities, mostly because they tend to focus on the productive 
sectors. Their policy of non-interference in government policies and their limited use of 
conditionalities was also found to make non-DAC donors popular with partner 
governments. Finally, emerging donors scored well in terms of speed of disbursement, 
which emerged as a key priority for partner governments along with alignment and 
ownership. For these reasons, partner country governments sometimes do not see the 
necessity of integrating non-DAC donors in coordination structures (ibid., 46–47). 
However, there are considerable differences among partner countries. A strategic approach 
to keep DAC and non-DAC donors separate was found in Cambodia and Ethiopia, for 
example, and this arguably allowed the national governments to increase their bargaining 
power towards donors. In contrast, in Zambia the government seemed less interested in 
strategically using the presence of non-DAC donors to bolster its negotiating power, 
presumably because the share of aid provided by non-DAC donors is smaller than in 
Cambodia and Ethiopia, and because in Zambia aid dependency is lower, meaning that 
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obtaining negotiating power towards donors is less of a priority for the government. In 
Zambia, new donors were seen to be participating in donor coordination mechanisms and 
some sectoral advisory groups. This was found to be the result of various factors: firstly, 
traditional donors were engaging with non-DAC donors and showing openness to dialogue 
and learning from the BRICS countries in particular (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa). Second, the national government encouraged non-DAC donors to participate in 
coordination mechanisms. Thirdly, staff from non-DAC donors’ embassies showed 
willingness to share experiences and information with other donors (ibid. 30–31). 
4.4 Overview of the advantages and disadvantages of different coordination 
approaches 
The above analysis indicates that there is no universal approach to managing diversity that 
both maximises the benefits and minimises the costs of strong donor coordination, as 
Table 1 shows. 
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of different coordination approaches 
Advantages & disadvantages Pooling Division of labour (DoL) 
Coordination 
through 
communication 
Reduced transaction costs +++ ++ + 
Efficient aid allocation +++ ++ + 
Coherence of donor strategies +++ ++ + 
Pluralism of approaches – – – + 
Reduced collective action 
problems (free-riding, 
competition for staff, etc.) 
+++ ++ + 
Partner country ownership 
and alignment – – – – – – 
Tied aid – – – + 
Loss of donor expertise – – – + 
Opportunities for including 
non-DAC donors + ++ +++ 
Note: The plus and minus signs refer to the difference the adoption of these approaches would make as compared to a situation of 
no coordination. 
Source: Own compilation 
4.5 Synergies and trade-offs between approaches 
In particular, there seems to be a trade-off between minimising transaction costs and 
minimising the risks of reducing fragmentation. Coordination through communication 
appears to be the best approach for maintaining partner country ownership and avoiding an 
increase in tied aid and loss of expertise. On the other hand, it is the least suitable approach 
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for reducing transaction costs. The trade-off is even greater than what can be shown in the 
table, because improving the efficiency of aid allocation and the coherence of approaches 
with a ‘coordination through communication’ approach comes at a higher price in terms of 
transaction costs as compared to pooling or DoL. Among the benefits associated with 
reducing fragmentation, only mitigating collective action problems seems to require a 
reduction in the number of donors. Other benefits, such as more efficient allocation of 
resources and coherence among approaches and strategies could also be achieved via 
increased coordination among multiple donors. This means that while the benefit of 
reducing collective action problems, such as free-riding and the poaching of officials, can be 
achieved only with pooling, and to a lesser extent with DoL, all other advantages can in 
principle also be reaped with coordination through communication. This, however, is likely 
to happen at a higher price as compared to pooling or DoL due to the larger transaction costs 
involved in coordinating many donors. 
The trade-off between having more choice and accepting higher transaction costs is 
unavoidable and each country will need to make this cost-benefit analysis for itself (OECD 
2011b, 19). Partner governments tend to prioritise ownership and alignment when choosing 
a strategy for managing diversity and often strategically choose to keep donors separate in 
order to boost their bargaining power (Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 26–30). This 
makes it unlikely that partner countries would ask donors to deliver all aid through one 
multilateral organisation, for example. However, partner countries’ strategies will also be 
shaped by contextual elements that determine their ability to take advantage from multiple 
aid sources (Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 34), as well as by the need to reduce 
transaction costs and the perceived risk of reducing the number of donors. The context not 
only determines what is feasible, but also shapes partner governments’ incentives for or 
against implementing different approaches such as pooling, DoL, or coordination through 
communication. Taking incentives into account is crucial because the choice of tools and 
options for managing diversity is not a purely technical one, but a matter of negotiation 
among the different political and strategic interests (DFID 2010, 2). 
Three important contextual elements that shape partner countries’ strategies for managing 
diversity are: i) the quality of government institutions, ii) the coordination structure already 
in place, and iii) the nature of the relationship between donors and the national government. 
Firstly, the quality of government institutions can be a very important factor for choosing an 
approach to managing diversity. It defines the government’s ability to bear transaction costs 
and determines at what point the presence of multiple donors starts to become a problem. 
Countries with better institutions (see Section 5.2) can benefit from a degree of 
fragmentation that would be far too high for less advanced countries (Dreher et al. 2013).17 
While countries at different stages of economic development can have similar levels of 
donor proliferation and equally weak aid coordination mechanisms, the effects of 
proliferation on government capacity may be substantially worse in less developed countries 
(McCormick / Schmitz 2011). Thus, partner countries with stronger capacities to manage a 
                                                          
17  For example, Dreher et al. (2013) find that in Vietnam the multitude of different donors was regarded 
as an advantage by government officials who were able to set their own priorities and schedules for 
meetings. Multiple international contacts established through aid were considered useful to promote 
international trade and foreign direct investment. On the other hand, in Burkina Faso, a country with 
weaker institutions, government officials reported being overburdened as a result of aid fragmentation. 
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multiplicity of donors are often able and willing to incur relatively higher transaction costs 
in order to gain room for manoeuvre and take advantage of the diversity of expertise. They 
might thus prefer to deal with individual donors rather than with a group of development 
partners (Rogerson 2005, 544). 
Second, the coordination structure already in place in a specific country also plays a role 
when considering different approaches to managing diversity. The status quo influences the 
perceived need to change or strengthen established coordination structures. For example, 
Carbone (2012, 10) notes that, in countries where coordination mechanisms worked 
relatively well, such as Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, or Zambia, EU efforts to act more 
cohesively were considered redundant and undesirable. Instead, countries with weak 
coordination mechanisms, such as Cameroon or Senegal, considered greater EU 
cohesiveness as a potential tool for involving reluctant donors in coordination efforts. 
Moreover, the coordination structure already in place determines what can be aimed for in 
terms of short-term coordination objectives. In countries where coordination and alignment 
are weak, a phased approach seems to be more appropriate. Where coordination is already 
advanced, a more ambitious approach may be feasible from the start (Linn 2009, 11). This is 
also because creating coordination structures from scratch has rarely worked well, and 
experience shows that it is preferable to build on existing mechanisms (DFID 2010, 1). 
Setting up new, parallel structures can be damaging and may lead to confusing situations 
where donors struggle to know which policy or system they should align to (ODI 2005, 26; 
Linn 2009, 8). 
A third contextual element that might shape partner countries’ strategies for managing 
diversity is the nature of the relationship between donors and the national government, which 
shapes the partner country’s perceptions of the risks associated with reducing the number of 
donors. If donors prove unable or unwilling to submit to partner countries’ desires, then 
partner governments may prefer to have a large number of donors to play off against each 
other, rather than a cohesive group (Brinkman 2013, 15–16). In particular, DoL seems to be 
most suited to countries where donors and the partner government enjoy relatively high 
degrees of reciprocal trust and mutual understanding (Weingärtner 2008, 22). Indeed, the 
establishment of a DoL framework and the assessment of comparative advantages can be a 
very sensitive and even divisive exercise that requires donors and the government to closely 
work together (Wentzel 2011, 9; Schumacher / Sawadogo 2010, 64–66). 
Partner countries do not necessarily need to choose between pooling, DoL, and coordination 
through communication (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 20–21). Partner countries often 
prefer to focus on aid modalities and donors’ use of country systems instead of reducing the 
number of donors per sector or even per country. Also, they might decide to employ 
different coordination approaches for different phases of development cooperation. Both 
options are discussed in the sections below. 
4.6 Promoting coordination through the use of country systems 
Success in dealing with a multitude of donors might be related more to donors’ use of 
country systems than to the number of active donors per country or sector (Klingebiel 2013, 
6). Several countries that were relatively successful in managing diversity expressed a 
strong preference for budget support (BS) as a central piece of their strategies for better aid 
Managing diversity: what does it mean? An analysis of different approaches and strategies  
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 21 
coordination (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 8). Despite repeated commitments by donors 
to make larger use of country systems, progress is still limited, as donors are reluctant to 
release control over funds. To give an indication, in 2010 donors reported giving only about 
2.7% of ODA in the form of general BS (Lawson 2013, 17). The fact that most aid is being 
delivered through project aid that makes insufficient use of country systems is considered 
one of the main obstacles to better coordination at the country level (ODI 2005, 26; Booth 
2009, 100). Partner countries could thus let donors distribute their aid in as many sectors as 
they wish and instead concentrate on their use of country systems. 
The use of country systems helps to reduce collective action problems and strengthens the 
country’s institutions (Keijzer 2013, 25–26). Across the countries participating in the Global 
Partnership monitoring for 2013, the share of aid disbursements for the government sector that 
made use of national public financial management and procurement systems was 49%, well 
below the Busan target of 57%. The use of country systems does not seem to have increased 
for the 38 countries that have data for both 2011 and 2013 (OECD / UNDP 2014, 46). 
The aid modalities through which funds are delivered can increase or decrease the costs and 
benefits associated with different approaches to managing diversity. The extent to which 
pooling of resources undermines ownership and alignment largely depends on how pooled 
funds are delivered. Although multi-donor budget support (MDBS) could give donors an 
excessive influence over the partner country’s policies (Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson 2009, 
63–64) it has the potential for promoting ownership and alignment while also reducing 
transaction costs18 (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 48; Manuel et al. 2012, 38). 
On the other hand, pooled funding can also be delivered in a way similar to project aid, with 
detrimental effects on ownership and alignment. MDTFs are criticised for often being off-
budget and earmarked by donors for specific activities, and for making insufficient use of 
government systems (DFID 2010, 5–6; ODI 2005, 39; Booth 2009, 100).19 Pooled funds 
that retain many features of the traditional project approach tend to focus the efforts of 
donors and partner countries on the design and management of the common fund, diverting 
attention away from the strengthening of country systems. Because of the larger size of the 
funding, their potential to distract attention away from government processes and priorities 
is larger than for bilateral project aid (ODI 2008, 3). 
Equally, the amount of transaction costs produced by a ‘coordination through 
communication’ approach with multiple donors will depend on how bilateral programmes 
                                                          
18  For the moment, transaction costs do not seem to have fallen as a result of aid being delivered as BS 
(Riddell 2014, 10). An immediate reduction of transaction costs was not to be expected due to the new 
costs of intense multi-donor coordination and monitoring processes, coexisting with traditional project-
type aid instruments (Rogerson 2005, 535). Still, it is likely that the transactions costs per “unit of BS” 
are lower than for other aid modalities (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 48). 
19  For instance, in Tanzania the Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP) financed through an 
MDTF was strictly earmarked to a sub-sector within education and essentially operated like a large 
project. Similarly, in Uganda the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF) for water supply in small towns had a 
centralised project approach. Although it improved alignment and somewhat reduced fragmentation of 
funding in the urban sub-sector, its use of government systems was limited to being reported in the 
budget and appearing on the agenda of the Ministry contracts committee. In Mozambique, the three 
common funds established in the health sector ended up increasing transaction costs due to the creation 
of new structures and procedures (ODI 2008, 3). 
Elena Pietschmann 
22 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
are provided. Transaction costs will be substantially lower if bilateral donors avoid setting 
up parallel implementation units, make large use of country systems, and align the delivery 
of funds to the partner country’s budget cycles and reporting, disbursement and procurement 
modalities (ODI 2005, 10). 
While the use of country systems can be helpful in promoting coordination, three 
considerations speak against exclusively focusing coordination efforts on promoting the use 
of country systems and in particular the provision of aid through BS. First, the number of 
donors and the degree of coordination among them also influences how well BS modalities 
work. BS becomes difficult to manage with large numbers of donors (Carlsson / Schubert / 
Robinson 2009, 64) and its potential to reduce transaction costs is undermined by donors’ 
use of different conditionalities, by the presence of a multiplicity of monitoring missions, 
and by the diversity of disbursement procedures (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 48). 
For example, De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) find that in Mozambique the participation in BS 
by a growing number of donors increased transaction costs and reduced the effectiveness of 
BS, as meetings with the government became larger and less expert. Thus some argue that 
donor harmonisation and alignment with government systems through participation in BS is 
not enough, and that Mozambique would be better served by a decrease in the number of 
active donors, combined with more delegated cooperation (Carlsson / Schubert / Robinson 
2009, 65). Second, coordination efforts excessively focused on the BS element can weaken 
pre-existing cooperative arrangements with development partners that are not providing BS 
if the excluded donors feel rebuffed (Linn 2009, 8; Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 10–11; 
Killick / Castel-Branco / Gerster 2005). Third, the provision of BS is vulnerable to changes 
in the political relationship between partner countries and donors, and a freeze in BS would 
cause a disruption in coordination as well. 
Besides increased use of country systems, other commitments from the Busan High Level 
Forum are also important for managing diversity. The Busan Partnership document 
(Paragraph 18b) encourages the use of transparent, country-led and country-level results 
frameworks based on partner countries’ development priorities. Output and outcome 
indicators included in those frameworks are expected to serve as a common tool for all 
actors concerned to assess performance, and donors committed to limit the use of additional 
frameworks. The respect of this commitment would facilitate the management of multiple 
aid actors and channels by partner countries. The Busan commitment of increasing 
transparency and setting up AIMS (Paragraph 23) is also crucial for aid coordination, as 
discussed in Sections 5.2.2 and 6.2. 
4.7 Combining approaches 
Since no single ‘best’ approach to managing diversity can be identified, combining them 
could be an option for partner countries. In Rwanda for instance, while the government 
successfully introduced DoL, coordination is also pursued through pooling of resources, 
and basket funds are excluded from requirements to donors to concentrate their aid in a 
limited number of sectors (Nkuzi 2010, 2). A similar stance was taken by the government 
of Malawi (Government of Malawi 2010, 22). Cambodia prefers to deal with the diversity 
of donors by focusing on the implementation of programme-based approaches (PBAs), 
which sometimes include delegated cooperation and co-financing arrangements, rather 
than going for a strict DoL approach (Wentzel 2011, 10). The different approaches to 
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managing diversity may also reinforce each other. For example, structures for dialogue 
and coordination through communication might be set up as a first step towards DoL 
(Linn 2009, 19–20) and pooled funds can promote the coordination of projects carried out 
by bilateral donors (DFID 2010, 7).20 
Partner governments may also adopt different approaches for different phases of develop-
ment cooperation. Building on Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre (2013), a distinction can be 
made between three levels at which coordination in development cooperation can take 
place in a partner country: at the programming level, at the implementation level, and at 
the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) level.21 
Partner countries could adopt different coordination mechanisms for the design of country 
strategies, for financing and implementation arrangements, and for M&E reports and 
missions. For example, they could foster joint analysis, which would then facilitate donor 
coordination at the implementation level even if aid would continue to be delivered 
through bilateral channels (Hoyos / Muggah 2009, 54; Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 
41). In its current form of implementation, Joint Programming (JP) could be seen as a 
combination of different approaches for the programming and the implementation levels 
of coordination. Indeed, while the term could suggest joint design, financing, and 
implementation of programmes, for the moment JP has mostly been about developing a 
common country strategy, while implementation is supposed to take place via bilateral 
donors distributed in different sectors through a DoL arrangement. Financing decisions 
and the organisation of programme delivery is usually done separately by each EU 
member state and the Commission (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 41). 
Partner country governments may also have different preferences in different sectors, as 
some line ministries might have better capacities than others for dealing with multiple 
donors. Stronger institutions in certain sectors also make it more likely that donors will 
make greater use of country systems when delivering aid to those sectors (Rocha Menocal 
/ Mulley 2006, 8). The interviews conducted for this paper indicate that there are large 
differences in the functioning of sector working groups, depending on the institutional 
quality of the relevant line ministry. Moreover, some sectors tend to have fewer donors 
than others, meaning that fragmentation might not constitute an equally pressing concern 
in all areas (Pietschmann 2014, 77–78). 
 
                                                          
20  In Zambia, for example, basket funding mechanisms included in sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) 
appear to have increased coordination among bilateral donors, although pooled funds represented a 
small share of ODA and bilateral project aid continued to run in parallel (Leiderer 2013, 14). 
21  In Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre (2013, 23) the three levels of coordination are: i) The policy level 
(concerning principles, standards, and strategic approaches, such as common positions on aid 
effectiveness reached at international High Level Forums); ii) The programming level (regarding 
specific country strategies adopted during the aid programming phase, such as country strategy 
documents, the choice of focal sectors, alignment with partner-country systems, etc.); iii) The 
implementation level (touching on coordination during the aid-delivery phase, such as joint 
implementation arrangements like PBAs). The first level of coordination is not relevant for the topic 
discussed here, as it concerns coordination processes that take place above the country level. Instead, 
this paper introduces the M&E phase as a separate level at which coordination can take place. 
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5 Partner country leadership in managing diversity 
Despite the multiplicity of possible strategies and approaches to managing diversity, some 
elements can be identified that will be crucial for every approach to aid coordination. If 
managing diversity is defined as the management of aid from different sources by the 
partner country, then partner country leadership in coordination efforts is essential, 
independently of the specific approach chosen (Building Block on Managing Diversity and 
Reducing Fragmentation 2014b). Given donors’ reluctance to share power and release 
control over their funding, coordination requires a decisive push from the partner country 
government (Woods 2011, 13). Widespread lack of country leadership has been identified as 
a major obstacle for coordination efforts (EC 2011, 10). Government leadership seems to be 
particularly important for DoL, because strong leadership is needed to push reluctant donors 
to undertake an assessment of their comparative advantages and to take forward the 
concentration of aid (Wentzel 2011, 9; Linn 2009, 12–13; Schumacher / Sawadogo 2010, 
64–66; Weingärtner 2008, 19, 23).22 
Partner countries differ widely as to the degree to which they are able and willing to take the 
lead in coordination efforts. In some countries, such as Cambodia or Uganda, there are 
coordination structures led by relatively active governments. In others, such as Somalia or 
Zimbabwe, there is almost no capacity in the government to lead coordination efforts. In most 
countries, national governments are gradually developing capacities for aid coordination, 
while multilateral institutions – the United Nations and the World Bank in particular – play a 
strong leadership role in coordination activities (DFID 2010, 2). Aid coordination has 
advanced mostly where the government has taken leadership and has been very assertive, as in 
Rwanda (Nkuzi 2010, 1–2). The following sections discuss the main elements that shape 
partner countries’ willingness and ability to take the lead in managing diversity. 
5.1 Partner country willingness to undertake coordination efforts 
Partner countries may be reluctant to take the lead in coordination efforts for a number of 
reasons, including: 
x the risk of reducing their room to manoeuvre 
x perverse incentives among government officials  
x weak bargaining power towards donors 
x perception of insufficient benefits from costly coordination efforts 
x lack of mutual trust between the partner government and donors. 
First, stronger donor coordination risks reducing the partner country government’s room for 
manoeuvre, as discussed in Section 4. This can induce partner countries to prefer to keep 
donors fragmented, even if that produces higher transaction costs. 
Second, a number of perverse incentives on the government side can work against 
rationalising the provision of aid. Government officials in partner countries are often 
reluctant to undertake coordination efforts because uncoordinated and intransparent allo-
                                                          
22  For the moment, participation of partner countries in the DoL process has been very weak, with best 
practices limited to four countries: Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana and Zambia (Klingebiel / Morazán / 
Negre 2013, 37). 
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cations make it easier to use aid resources for personal benefits and patronage networks 
(Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 2006, 10; Knack / Rahman 2008, 13–14; Djankov 
/ Montvalo / Reynal-Querol 2008; Acharya / De Lima / Moore 2004, 8; Lawson 2013, 18). 
Third, partner governments often lack either the necessary bargaining power or sufficient 
interest to exercise leadership in the coordination process. Countries with low aid 
dependency enjoy enough bargaining power to tell donors where they want them to work 
and how. At the same time, countries where ODA does not play a central role tend to have 
limited interest towards engaging in costly coordination efforts (ECOSOC 2012, 5). Aid 
dependency makes partner governments reluctant to ask donors to exit certain sectors 
because they fear a reduction in overall funding to the country (Schulz 2007, 5; Government 
of Malawi 2010, 18).23 Such concerns are less pressing for countries that are not aid 
dependent. Middle-income countries have much more bargaining power, especially towards 
small donors, and in some cases (e.g. India) have even asked them to leave (Rogerson 2005, 
544). However, DoL is often seen as an effort not worth undertaking where ODA represents 
a small share of the country’s budget and development cooperation has a low political 
priority (TT DOL 2011, 9).24 Low aid dependency can also occur in low-income countries 
that are resource-rich, and can reduce the government’s interest in aid coordination efforts. 
This was the case for example in Angola, Mozambique, or Zambia (ODI 2005, 29; Vollmer 
2013b; Weingärtner 2008, 19; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 29). Lack of govern-
ment engagement in these countries is more problematic because low income countries 
generally have large numbers of donors and weak institutions that would benefit from more 
effective aid coordination (TT DOL 2011, 2). 
Finally, the extent to which partner countries are willing to exercise leadership in co-
ordination efforts also depends on the political relations between national authorities and 
the international community. Partner countries’ ability to modify donor behaviour depends 
on partner governments’ and donors’ capacity to develop a relationship based on mutual 
trust and confidence (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 22). Difficult political relations can 
                                                          
23  However, being aid dependent does not necessarily mean that the partner country cannot set conditions 
for the acceptance of aid, as the case of Afghanistan shows. Despite its aid dependency, Afghanistan 
managed to take the lead in coordination efforts. The government of Afghanistan has established a set 
of ‘hard’ conditions for the acceptance of aid, such as a limited number of sectors for any particular 
donor, minimum contributions before donors can expand to new sectors, and an upper limit for 
overhead costs (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 8). Still, Afghanistan is an ‘aid darling’ (OECD 2012a, 
49) and donors’ strong commitment to giving aid to the country arguably allowed the government to 
insist on hard conditions for the acceptance of aid. The situation might have been different in aid-
dependent countries with fewer donors. For example, interviews in Madagascar, a country identified as 
a potential ‘aid orphan’ (OECD 2013, 10; Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing 
Fragmentation 2014a, 52–54), suggest that the government would like to introduce DoL, but the 
country’s low aid receipts will probably make it hard for the government to refuse aid that does not 
comply with the proposed DoL framework. 
24  For example, Vietnam, initially took active part in harmonisation efforts and was showcased at the High 
Level Forum on Harmonisation and Alignment in Rome (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 18). The 
country recently graduated to lower middle-income (LMIC) status and is able to offset imbalances in 
ODA allocation across sectors using domestic resources. Since ODA makes up only a small share of the 
budget, the government now takes the view that efficiency gains from a major reorganisation of the donor 
presence are unlikely to be sufficient to justify the effort (Wentzel 2011, 9–10). On the other hand, in 
Bangladesh the reduction of aid dependency allowed the government to take the lead in coordination 
efforts thanks to its increased bargaining power (Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing 
Fragmentation 2014, 16). Relatively strong engagement by the Government of Bangladesh might be due 
to the fact that the country receives very large volumes of aid in absolute terms, and that ODA still makes 
up nearly 37% of the government’s annual development budget (ibid., 10). 
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be a huge obstacle for the functioning of government-led coordination mechanisms, even 
when the partner country has relatively strong institutions in place (ODI 2005). For 
instance in Ethiopia, despite good capacities in the Ethiopian government for aid 
management, recurrent political disagreements between donors and the national govern-
ment led to periodic disruptions of coordination efforts (DFID 2010, 9). A history of open 
and frank – if not always free-of-friction – relations between donors and the national 
government was identified as an important factor in countries where the government has 
taken the lead in the coordination process, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda and 
Vietnam (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 22).25 
5.2 Partner country capacity to undertake coordination efforts 
Managing aid from different sources requires considerable government capacity in partner 
countries. The partner country’s institutional strength is a crucial determinant of success in 
managing diversity, independently of the specific approach chosen (EC 2014, 6; 
Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013, 42–43; Kasuga 2008, 14–16; ODI 2005, 22; Wentzel 
2011, 9). Strong country systems – and in particular a reliable public financial manage-
ment system, internal policy coherence, and coordination among the different ministries 
are all crucial elements for a successful aid management by partner countries (DFID 2010, 
5–6; Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 20–21; Weingärtner 2008, 9; Manuel et al. 2012). 
Unfortunately, the institutional capacity necessary for managing diversity is not found in 
many partner countries (DFID 2010, 2). In particular, countries with high aid dependency 
tend to have at the same time a more fragmented aid landscape and a lower institutional 
capacity to enforce discipline among donors (De Renzio 2009, 13). Building strong 
institutions is a long and difficult process that cannot be achieved through aid (Keijzer 
2013). However, even in fragile states there are a number of specific activities that can in-
crease partner governments’ capacity to manage diversity and encourage donors to comply 
with the country’s preferences (ODI 2005, 22). The following sections lay out some im-
portant elements that can assist partner countries in managing diversity. 
5.2.1 A clear aid policy 
The establishment of clear priorities and strategies for aid coordination is a crucial success 
factor in managing diversity. Rocha Menocal / Mulley (2006, 22) analyse a set of countries 
that were successful in managing diversity. While there were important differences in the 
strategies adopted by these countries, all the partner governments involved had set out their 
                                                          
25  At the same time, the relationship between donors and partner countries is also shaped by coordination 
efforts (DFID 2010, 1). If focused on real dialogue, the coordination process can help to build trust 
between donors and partner governments, as well as among donors themselves. In Bangladesh, for 
example, the establishment of a vibrant dialogue between the government and development partners 
within the Bangladesh Development Forum has strongly supported aid management (Building Block 
on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation 2014, 15). Although too much emphasis on the 
process can be damaging (Weingärtner 2008, 23), assessments of coordination efforts in different 
countries stress that the exercise of formulating common strategies is often more important than the 
resulting strategy document itself. Inclusive and thorough processes are key to creating the trust and 
cooperative spirit necessary during the subsequent implementation phase (Linn 2009, 11). However, 
this potential benefit of coordination processes is often undermined by the frequent rotation of donor 
agencies’ staff (Woods 2011, 11). 
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own development priorities and approaches and developed clear aid policies which have 
provided the basis for effective aid management. This also holds for fragile states where 
donors play an important role in setting up coordination structures. Ball and van Beijnum 
(2010, 21–22) analyse 15 MDTFs in several fragile states and find that, while these 
mechanisms proved helpful for managing diversity overall, the mere existence of a pooled 
funding mechanism did not in itself produce better coordination. A major factor leading to 
uneven performance in the various countries was found to be the quality of the government-
led strategy on which the allocation of funds was based. 
By developing clear aid policies, partner countries can set standards and criteria for the 
acceptance of aid. Of course, these will be all the more powerful when the government 
enjoys enough bargaining power to refuse aid that does not meet these conditions, as was 
the case for example in Ethiopia26 or in Cambodia (Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013, 
25). But even when the partner government is in a position of weakness towards donors, 
detailed rules might help donors to align, or at least make it more difficult for them to 
justify their lack of alignment (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 22). A coherent plan with 
clear deadlines makes it easier for donor country offices to obtain headquarter’s clearance 
for the requested adjustments (Nkuzi 2010, 1–2). 
Aid policies should indicate partner countries’ preferences regarding donor coordination at 
the programming, implementation, and M&E level. Important elements that should be 
contained in aid policies are summarised in the table below: 
Table 2: Detailed aid policies for different levels of aid coordination 
Levels of 
coordination Areas concerned What the aid policy should specify 
Programming  Strategies adopted during the  
aid-programming phase, such as 
country and sector strategy 
documents, the choice of focal 
sectors, etc. 
– Preferences for pooling, DoL, coordination 
through communication arrangements, or a 
combination of the above 
– Development priorities for aid allocation  
– Inclusion of non-DAC donors in coordination 
efforts 
Implementation Coordination instruments in the 
aid-delivery phase, such as joint 
implementation arrangements 
like programme-based 
approaches (PBAs) 
– Aid modalities 
– Use of country systems by donors for 
procurement, disbursing, and implementation 
– Stance on technical cooperation (TC) and 
project implementation units (PIUs) 
– Alignment with national budget 
(synchronisation, aid on/off budget) 
Monitoring & 
evaluation 
Coordination in the M&E phase, 
such as joint evaluations and 
harmonisation of reporting 
requirements 
– Degree of partner country involvement  
in M&E 
– Preferences for harmonisation of reporting 
standards 
Source: Own compilation 
                                                          
26  In Ethiopia, ownership of and alignment to the national aid strategy are considered so important that 
even grants are sometimes not accepted if they do not finance the priorities stated in the national plan, 
or if they come with conditions or delays that are considered unacceptable (Greenhill / Prizzon / 
Rogerson 2013, 25). 
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At the programming level: A comprehensive aid policy should guide aid allocation by 
defining the sectoral and thematic priorities to be addressed by donors. In case the approach 
chosen by the partner country for managing diversity includes DoL, the preferred 
distribution of donors across sectors should be spelled out. It should also lay out the form 
and structure of coordination mechanisms and forums. Such forums now exist in most 
partner countries, but often respond more to donor reporting requirements than to the partner 
country government’s needs (UNDP 2011, 4). Experience suggests that a lean coordination 
structure is preferable (Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation 
2014a, 22), as a high number of parallel coordination forums can lead to the loss of 
overview and raised transaction costs (Government of Malawi 2010, 35). 
At the implementation level: Aid strategies are particularly effective if they lay out not only 
the policy priorities but also the partner country’s preferences for coordination mechanisms 
during the implementation phase. In Uganda, for instance, interviewed donors suggested 
that the government’s demand for better coordination could be more easily met if the 
government produced a document that clearly spelled out who donors should address and in 
what sequence for a coordinated programme implementation. In the absence of clear 
procedures, donors will be tempted to bypass the Ministry of Finance or other institutions in 
charge of coordination and directly deal with line ministries and local authorities. 
Preferences in terms of aid modalities and the use of country systems by donors for 
procurement, disbursing, and implementation should also be clearly expressed. Partner 
countries should also develop a clear position on the use of project implementation units 
(PIUs)27, on whether and in what form they wish to receive technical cooperation (TC), and 
on how to deal with aid that is off-budget (EC 2008, 18). 
At M&E level: It is important that aid policies give clear indications of the extent to which 
the partner government wishes to take part in monitoring and evaluation activities. Partner 
countries should also express their preferences regarding donor joint monitoring, 
supervision, and evaluation missions, as well as for the harmonisation of reporting standards 
and requirements (Lancaster et al. 2003, 35). 
Aid policies should also clarify the extent to which partner countries wish to include non-
DAC donors in coordination efforts. This can vary from country to country, as discussed in 
Section 4.3.3. Even in the case where it prefers to keep DAC and non-DAC donors separate, 
a partner government may still wish to clearly express a need to be better informed about aid 
activities carried out by non-DAC donors on its territory, since information of this kind is 
still very scarce (Sinha / Hubbard 2012). The finance ministries of partner countries have 
difficulty in obtaining information on the monetary value of Chinese aid activities, for 
example (Grimm et al. 2011, 4–5). 
                                                          
27  The OECD defines PIUs as dedicated management units established by donors in partner countries to 
support the implementation of development projects or programmes. This practice undermines the 
development of capacity in the partner government for planning and implementation, and weakens its 
accountability to parliaments and citizens. Therefore, the Paris Declaration encourages donors to: 
“avoid to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and 
implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes” (OECD 2011, online: http://www.oecd.org 
/site/dacsmpd11/indicator6strengthencapacitybyavoidingparallelimplementationstructures.htm). 
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The degree of donor involvement in the development of aid policies and country assistance 
strategies differs from country to country (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 22). Joint analysis 
can be particularly helpful in countries with limited government capacities (Hoyos / Muggah 
2009, 54; DFID 2010, 2). Other countries might prefer to involve donors only at a later stage 
(Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 7–8).28 While excessive donor involvement in the 
preparation of such documents might undermine the partner country’s ownership of the 
strategy, it is important to avoid disconnects between the government’s and the donors’ 
strategies (Linn 2009, 10). Jointly developing aid-strategy documents helps to prevent the 
emergence of such disconnects and encourages donors’ compliance during the 
implementation phase (Government of Malawi 2010, 19–20). A jointly developed strategy 
can also facilitate the establishment of a framework for assessing donor performance, which 
has proven important for the implementation of aid policies (Nkuzi 2010, 1–2; ECOSOC 
2012 17; Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 11). 
Preparing joint assistance strategies can be a costly and lengthy exercise that can raise 
transaction costs on the donor side.29 Unless they are simple, tightly prioritised, and 
sequenced, joint strategic frameworks risk resulting in higher transaction costs even for 
the partner country (DFID 2010, 3–4). A review of joint country strategies by the African 
Development Bank judges the process to be particularly useful for establishing effective 
country-assistance programmes and fostering alignment, while the potential of the process 
to reduce transaction costs was in most cases assessed as modest or even negligible (AfDB 
2006). 
5.2.2 Effective aid management institutions 
To ensure the implementation of aid policies, effective aid management institutions need 
to be in place (Ohno / Shimamura 2007; Schumacher / Sawadogo 2010, 64–66). Aid 
management units are generally located within an institution in charge of central co-
ordination, such as the Ministry of Finance or the Office of the Prime Minister. The 
Ministry of Finance is a particularly suitable location for three main reasons: First, the 
national budget provides a useful anchor for government-led aid coordination and align-
ment (ODI 2005, 22; Moon / Mills 2010). Secondly, the Ministry of Finance is the best 
placed for guaranteeing greater coherence between domestic resources and aid (Manuel et 
al. 2012, 4). Thirdly, while line ministries often resist central coordination of aid for fear 
of losing funds, finance ministries have more incentives to push for a coordinated and 
centralised approach that would give them more control over funds (Klingebiel / Morazán 
/ Negre 2013, 15–16). 
                                                          
28  For instance, the Government of Afghanistan presented donors with “Securing Afghanistan’s Future”, 
an extremely detailed document that stands in contrast to the needs assessment developed by donors. 
Based on a visit of less than one week to the country, the donor-driven needs assessment was 
considered by the Government of Afghanistan as unrealistic in its cost estimates and insufficiently 
focused on state-building (Rocha Menocal / Mulley 2006, 7–8). 
29  For instance, the preparation of joint strategies took two to three years in Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Cambodia. In the case of Cambodia it was reported that preparing a joint strategy had cost donors twice 
as much than if they had developed their own country strategies. For the African Development Bank, 
estimates assess that on average 25% more time and money are required for joint strategies as 
compared to individual country strategies (Linn 2009, 13). 
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At the same time, it is important that aid management institutions are well connected to 
the rest of the government and spread awareness about the importance of aid coordination 
in other ministries beyond finance ministries. Interviews in Bangladesh suggest that 
despite the existence of an effective aid management unit, line ministries have limited 
knowledge of aid coordination efforts and the aid effectiveness agenda in general. Weak 
ownership of coordination efforts by line ministries was identified as one of the main 
obstacles to managing diversity by the Bangladeshi aid management unit. Institutions in 
charge of aid coordination should also have strong political backing by key policymakers. 
Interviews indicate that in many receiving countries the lack of strong political backing for 
the rationalisation of aid was one of the reasons why aid management institutions could 
not insist effectively on cross-sector DoL once the formal negotiations with donors had 
already been started. 
Strong aid management institutions allow partner governments to make effective use of 
existing coordination structures. The usefulness of forums for dialogue and coordination 
between donors and the partner government will largely depend on governments’ ability 
to go beyond mere information exchange and make use of those coordination structures 
for engaging in strategic policy discussions with donors (Woods 2011, 10). To achieve 
this, sufficient analytical capacity of the country’s aid coordination institutions is crucial 
(Leiderer 2013, 12). 
An important condition for aid management units to work effectively is the availability of 
reliable data on aid activities (Rocha Menochal / Mulley 2006, 22). In order to make 
efficient use of information on aid, partner countries should set up aid information 
management systems (AIMS) (Manuel et al. 2012, 39). Governments in many partner 
countries have found such databases helpful for maintaining a good overview of 
development activities, improving aid alignment with national priorities, and reflecting aid 
flows in national budgets. AIMS are not very common yet but their expansion could 
considerably ease coordination at a relatively low cost (EC 2014, 58). 
6 What can donors do? 
According to the definition adopted in this paper, the management of diversity should lie 
primarily in the hands of partner countries. However, success in coordinating aid also 
requires an active contribution by development partners. An effective management of aid 
will be impossible without donors’ readiness to conform to partner countries’ priorities 
and aid policies. Given the wide range of possible strategies for managing diversity, the 
actions required from donors will vary from country to country depending on the approach 
chosen by the partner government. However, independently of the specific approach 
chosen, donors can always support both the willingness and the capacity of partner 
countries to manage diversity. 
6.1 Encourage partner countries’ leadership of coordination efforts 
Partner governments’ willingness to take the lead in coordination efforts is undermined by 
fear of losing funding and by the perception that coordinated donors might exercise 
excessive influence on domestic policies. Donors can address the first concern by 
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underlining their commitment to the principle set in the Accra Agenda for Action 
(Paragraph 17a) that DoL and other coordination processes will have no impact on overall 
aid volumes for individual countries. Addressing the fear that coordination might reduce 
partner governments’ bargaining power and undermine their ownership is more challenging. 
Here, reinforcing the link between coordination and alignment could be helpful. 
Indeed, full alignment of development assistance is impossible without donor 
coordination: even if every individual donor aligns its own development assistance to the 
country’s priorities, the overall allocation of aid might still end up being misaligned if 
uncoordinated donors choose to focus on the same areas of the national development 
strategy (Klingebiel / Morazán / Negre 2013). In this regard, the EU Joint Programming 
(JP) could be a particularly promising instrument because it aims at introducing DoL, 
while firmly anchoring development assistance in partner countries’ national development 
strategies. However, JP also carries the risk that the sectoral distribution of aid might be 
misaligned if head quarters’ preferences weigh more than the partner country’s ones when 
it comes to the choice of sectors to engage in (ibid., 48). Aligning development assistance 
to the national budget allows the government to coordinate aid spending with government 
spending, while also preparing the ground for the project/programme to move towards 
sector or general budget support in a second stage (Manuel et al. 2012, 40). 
In order to promote partner country leadership in coordination efforts and strengthen the 
link between coordination and alignment, donor agencies should further decentralise their 
decision-making process. Increased flexibility and autonomy from headquarters would 
enable country offices to be more accommodating for a country-led coordination that 
focuses on alignment (Wood et al. 2011, 26–27). Finally, donors can also encourage 
partner countries’ engagement in coordination efforts by funding case-by-case analyses on 
how partner governments can manage diversity in their specific context (Riddell 2014, 38; 
Linn 2009, 19–20). 
6.2 Support partner countries’ capacity in the area of aid management 
The quality of institutions in partner countries has been identified as a major factor 
determining success in managing diversity. Donors cannot ‘build the capacity of 
government’ if that government has different priorities. But they can support partner 
countries’ own plans to develop their systems for aid management and coordination 
(Keijzer 2013, 51). Even in fragile states where donors take up most of the coordination 
task, it is important that parallel efforts are geared towards building capacity for aid 
management in partner governments from the start. In Afghanistan – a fragile state with 
many donors – a main reason why aid coordination worked surprisingly well was the fact 
that UNDP started providing assistance to the government to develop capacity for aid 
coordination early on (ODI 2005, 21). In many countries, UNDP has been assisting 
capacity development of government officials in aid coordination and management. It has 
also promoted and accompanied the setting up of AIMS (UNDP 2011; 2006). Interviews 
in Madagascar suggest that this support has been important for advancing national efforts 
to enhance aid effectiveness. 
Specific capacity-development efforts seem to be particularly helpful when they address the 
government budgeting process. The national budget can serve as a basis for government-led 
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donor coordination, with donors and the government discussing the prioritisation of resources 
in a timeframe consistent with the budget cycle (ODI 2005, 22; Manuel et al. 2012, 40). 
Importantly, donors can support the creation of aid management units, as well as their 
strengthening in countries where they are already in place. Donor agencies can also facilitate 
the work of aid management units in two important ways: first, by minimising and 
harmonising the number of reports, assessments, and other project rules and requirements 
(ODI 2005, 10). Second, by making information on their aid activities regularly available and 
feeding it into the countries’ AIMS (Lawson 2013, 12).30 The format of aid data provided is 
important, as information on aid activities is particularly helpful if it is delivered in a way that 
can be easily aligned with the administrative / organisational classification and the functional / 
purpose classification of a partner government’s budget (Moon / Mills 2010, vii). 
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This paper has analysed the management of multiple actors and channels of development 
assistance from the partner country perspective. It has compared potential benefits and risks 
and disadvantages of different approaches to managing diversity, such as pooling of 
resources, DoL, and coordination through communication. It then laid out important ele-
ments that need to be in place for successful aid coordination efforts.  
It is difficult to say in the abstract which approach works better for managing diversity. In 
particular, a trade-off exists between minimising transaction costs and limiting the risks 
associated with reducing the number of active donors per sector. Each partner country will 
have to make its own assessment, and this assessment will largely depend on the country 
context, which also determines what is feasible in terms of implementation. Partner 
countries will have to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and 
choose the strategy or combination of strategies that is most suited to their specific context. 
Donor agencies can provide assistance by funding and in some cases managing the 
necessary analytical work. 
Despite the fact that approaches to managing diversity should be tailored to the local 
conditions, some elements have been identified that might help to manage diversity in 
general, independent of the approach chosen. Specifically, partner countries should develop 
clear aid policies, reinforce their budgeting process and set up effective aid management 
institutions assisted by an aid information management system (AIMS). Donors should 
reinforce the link between coordination and alignment and support the development of 
capacity for managing aid in partner countries. They can help to strengthen aid management 
institutions and ease the work of these institutions by harmonising their implementation and 
reporting requirements and by increasing transparency. 
                                                          
30  The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) aims at introducing an aid-reporting standard that 
provides information on aid activities in a form that can be read directly into partner countries’ AIMS. 
This is expected to reduce transaction costs both for donors (staff in country offices would spend less 
time coordinating, assembling and preparing information) and for partner countries (aid management 
institutions would not have to spend so much time collecting and verifying information, and feeding it 
into their AIMS) (Collin et al. 2009, 6). 
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Besides these crucial activities to be undertaken on both sides, there are also joint tasks for 
donors and partner countries: 
Improve the conditions for dialogue: Given the importance of establishing a relationship 
of trust between donors and partner governments, coordination meetings should be seen not 
only as transaction costs, but also as opportunities for dialogue. If it can build the trust and 
cooperative spirit necessary for the implementation of coordination frameworks, the process 
of formulating a coordination strategy might be even more important than the strategy 
document itself. This seems to somehow contradict the idea that coordination efforts should 
be outcome-oriented, focused on results and not on meetings. But the building of trust 
should also be considered a valuable outcome, and more efforts should be made for moving 
away from pure donor talkshops towards creating space for real dialogue between donors 
and partner countries. Experience of successful coordination efforts shows that it is crucial 
that there is a group of committed staff members from different donor agencies engaging in 
frequent communication with the government and among themselves (Wright 2001, 9–12). 
To allow the emergence of a cooperative spirit between donors and the government, 
officials in partner countries should engage fully in coordination meetings, and aid agencies 
should reconsider the frequent rotation of their staff. 
Establish strong mutual monitoring systems: The political economy of coordination and 
the role of incentives cannot be underestimated. Because of the lack of strong incentives on 
both the donor and the partner country side to push for increased coordination, it is crucial 
that monitoring systems are established to foster action by creating peer pressure among 
donors to implement commitments, and by strengthening mutual accountability 
relationships between donors and partner countries. Strong mutual accountability 
mechanisms have promoted the implementation of coordination commitments in Rwanda 
and Mozambique, for example (Nkuzi 2010, 1–2; Government of Malawi 2010). Mutual 
accountability systems centred on donor coordination have also proved helpful for 
improving relationships between donors and partner countries (ECOSOC 2012, 17; Rocha 
Menocal / Mulley 2006, 11). Of the countries that participated in the Global Partnership 
Monitoring Survey in 2013, only 59% reported having mutual assessment reviews in place 
(OECD / UNDP 2014, 89–90). More efforts should be made by both donors and partner 
countries to quickly reach the 100%-target agreed on in Busan. Information on progress 
should be shared publicly in order to allow the civil society in both donor and partner 
countries to exercise additional pressure (ODI 2005, 11). 
Promote policy discussion on fragmentation and managing diversity at the inter-
national level: Donors and partner countries should keep discussing different strategies for 
managing diversity and sharing experiences in order to diffuse best practices and report on 
challenges met. The Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation 
can offer a useful forum for continued sharing of knowledge and experiences, as well as for 
creating trust among bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, and partner countries. The 
Building Block could further upscale its efforts to raise awareness in the general public 
about the problems related to fragmentation. Donors’ accountability to taxpayers does not 
need to undermine cooperation and joint efforts if the benefits of coordination are 
adequately communicated to the public in donor countries (Rasmussen 2013, 42). 
Awareness of the damaging consequences of fragmentation and greater engagement in 
coordination efforts should also be promoted among new donors. Capitalising on its 
inclusive character, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
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(GPEDC) is in a good position to foster dialogue and information-sharing on development 
activities between DAC and non-DAC donors, as well as with partner countries. Further 
research can facilitate the discussion on successful methods to manage diversity in several 
ways: firstly, by collecting additional evidence on the success or failure of different 
approaches to managing diversity in differing contexts; secondly, by better operationalising 
the concept of transaction costs, so that reductions in transaction costs can be better 
measured and assessed (Wentzel 2011, 12–15); and thirdly, by developing indicators for 
tracking the degree and success of aid coordination efforts. 
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Annex I: List of organisations and persons interviewed 
Persons interviewed at donor headquarters 
Name Position Organisation Country 
Ludovic Signarbieux Programme Officer for 
Multilateral aid  
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
France 
Marta Wytrykowska Specialist of Development 
Cooperation 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Poland 
Nicoletta Merlo Deputy Head of Unit, Policy 
and Coherence 
EU Directorate General for 
Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO) 
European Union 
Timo Olkkonen Head of Unit, Department 
for Development 
Policy, Unit for General 
Development Policy and 
Planning 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Finland 
Ronald Meyer Head of Division, Policies 
Regarding Cooperation with 
Countries and Regions 
German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) 
Germany 
 
Persons interviewed in Bangladesh 
Name Position Organisation 
Arastoo Khan Additional Secretary, Economic 
Relations Division 
Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Bangladesh 
Monowar Ahmed Aid Effectiveness Unit, Economic 
Relations Division 
Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Bangladesh 
Johannes Schneider Head of Development Cooperation Embassy of Germany 
Roswitha Amels Deputy Head of Development 
Cooperation 
Embassy of Germany 
Stephanie Rousseau Head of Coordination & Aid 
Effectiveness 
Delegation of the European Union 
Nicolas Simard Deputy Director Embassy of Canada 
Carel Richter Deputy Head of Mission Embassy of the Netherlands 
Luke Bailey Head of Policy Coordination and 
Corporate Business 
Department for International 
Development (DFID)/UK 
Fahmida Khatun Research Director Centre for Policy Dialogue 
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Persons interviewed in Bangladesh (cont.) 
Name Position Organisation 
Mogens Strunge 
Larsen 
Head of Cooperation Royal Danish Embassy 
Wahida Musarrat 
Anita 
Programme Officer Royal Danish Embassy 
Todd Andrews Deputy Programme 
Office Director 
US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Lindsey Moore Economist US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Karolina Hulterström First Secretary, Development 
Cooperation 
Embassy of Sweden 
 
Persons interviewed in Madagascar 
Name Position Organisation 
Jean 
Razafindravonona 
General Director of Budget Ministry of Finance: Government of 
Madagascar  
Isaora Zefania 
Romalahy 
Head of the Aid Coordination 
Permanent Secretariat  
Office of the Prime Minister, Government 
of Madagascar 
Jean-Marie  
Vianey Dabire 
Economist African Development Bank (AfDB) 
Charlotte Adriaen Head of Department, Governance, 
Economics, Commerce and Social 
Sectors 
Delegation of the European Union  
Helmut Burmeister Resident Director Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
Alan Walsh Head Coordinator for the 
Environmental Programme 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
Patricia Aubras Assistant Director Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD) 
Naivosoa 
Andriamitandrina 
Representative Plate-forme Nationale des Organisations 
de la Société Civile de Madagascar 
(PFNOSCM) 
Hajime Watanabe First Assistant of the Resident 
Representative 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)  
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Persons interviewed in Madagascar (cont.) 
Name Position Organisation 
Voahary 
Rakotovelomanantsoa 
Head of Programme Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)  
Manoela 
Razafimahefa 
Head of Programme Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) 
Hery Ramiarison Professor, Economics Department, 
Faculty of Law, Economics, 
Administration and Sociology 
University of Antananarivo 
Janne M. Knutrud Senior Adviser Embassy of Norway 
Daniel 
Andriamanjaka 
Chief-of-Staff Embassy of the United Kingdom 
Nicolette Matthijsen Programme Director Helvetas 
Julia Randimbisoa Assistant Director Helvetas 
Philippe Georgeais Director, SCAC Cultural and 
Cooperation Service 
Embassy of France 
Sebastien Vittet Cooperation Attaché, SCAC 
Cultural and Cooperation Service 
Embassy of France 
Quentin Gouzien Economist, SCAC Cultural and 
Cooperation Service 
Embassy of France 
Miriam J. Onivogui Project Development Officer  US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Cathy Jane Bowes Programme Officer US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
 
Persons interviewed in Uganda 
Name Position Organisation 
Fred Twesiime Principal Economist, Aid Liaison 
Department 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development, Government of 
Uganda 
Mary Ssonko-
Nabacwa 
Senior Lecturer of Development 
Studies 
Uganda Christian University of Mukono 
Florence Cassam 
Chenai 
Cooperation Officer Embassy of France 
Udo Weber Head of Development Cooperation Embassy of Germany 
Elena Pietschmann 
48 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Persons interviewed in Uganda (cont.) 
Name Position Organisation 
Christine Gandomi Deputy Program Officer US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Zdenek L.Suda Supervisory Program Officer US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Barry Wojega Senior Budget Specialist US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
Simone Knapp Head of Office, Coordination 
Office for Development 
Cooperation 
Embassy of Austria 
Sybille Schmidt Programme Officer, Social Sectors 
and Economic Affairs 
Delegation of the European Union  
 
Persons interviewed from other partner countries 
Name Position Organisation Country 
Mwamba Peni Public Policy Specialist Cabinet Office, Policy 
Analysis and 
Coordination Division 
Zambia 
Karolin Pacheco Vice-Minister for 
Planning and Technical 
Cooperation 
Ministry for Planning and 
Technical Cooperation 
Honduras 
Gamar Eissa Elswar Director, Aid 
Management and 
Coordination Unit 
Ministry of Finance and 
the National Economy 
Republic of the Sudan 
Richard Zimba Debt and Aid Officer Ministry of Finance Malawi 
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Annex II: Glossary of key concepts 
Aid information management system (AIMS): Data-bases collecting information on aid 
activities within a partner country. These platforms can be used by governments in partner 
countries to maintain an overview of development activities, improve aid alignment to 
national priorities, and reflect aid flows in national budgets. 
Aid modalities: Aid modalities have primarily been distinguished according to the 
technical arrangements governing the disbursement and the management of funds. These 
include: i) type and terms of finance; ii) disbursement channels; iii) procurement 
conditions; and iv) targeting and tracking of donor resources. 
Alignment: Donor countries target development cooperation to partner countries’ 
development objectives and use local systems. 
Cross-sector division of labour (DoL): A coordinated distribution of donors across 
sectors, with individual donors concentrating aid in a limited number of areas. Donors 
focus on areas where they have a comparative advantage, while contributing to other 
sectors through delegated cooperation. 
Delegated cooperation: Delegated cooperation, also known as ‘silent partnership’, allows 
bilateral donors to support sectors where they do not have a presence by channelling aid 
though another bilateral donor active in that area. 
Fragmentation: Aid fragmentation refers to the problem that individual donors tend to be 
engaged in too many countries, and spread their aid across too many sectors, which 
produces high transaction costs on both sides of the aid relationship. 
Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate and simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication. 
Joint evaluation: An evaluation of a development project or programme to which 
different donors and/or partners take part. Joint evaluations can vary largely regarding the 
extent to which individual actors cooperate in the evaluation process, pool resources for 
evaluation and combine their reporting.  
Managing diversity: The management of different sources of aid by the partner country, 
aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid in a complex aid landscape. 
Multi-donor budget support (MDBS): Budget support jointly provided by several 
donors. It is the most common modality of budget support. Generally, dedicated budget 
support donor groups are established to coordinate the policy dialogue between the partner 
government and donors and discuss the conditions that need to be in place for the 
disbursement of funds. 
Multi-donor trust funds (MTDFs): MDTFs collect contributions from many bilateral 
donors and administer them under a single governance structure, generally managed by 
multilateral donors such as the World Bank. MDTFs are increasingly used in fragile states 
and serve both as a joint funding modality and a coordination framework. 
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Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable to each other for 
development results. 
Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve 
their institutions and tackle corruption. 
Pooling of resources: Donors pool funding for development cooperation and channel it 
through multilateral vehicles of some form – multilateral organisations, trust funds, co-
financing arrangements among bilateral donors such as the Mutual Reliance Initiative 
(MRI), or through the partner country’s institutions in the form of multi-donor budget 
support (MDBS). 
Programme-based approaches (PBAs): a coordinated support for a locally owned 
development programme such as a national development strategy or sector and thematic 
programmes. PBAs should: i) be led by the partner country ii) have a single 
comprehensive programme and budget framework; iii) include a harmonisation of donor 
reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement; (iv) make increased use of 
country systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, and 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Implementation of PBAs can take place through 
different aid instruments ranging from basket funding of specific activities or reform 
programmes to joint support of Sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) and sector and general 
budget support. 
Project implementation units (PIUs): Dedicated management units established by 
donors in partner countries to support the implementation of development projects or 
programmes. 
Sector-wide approaches (SWAPs): Approaches that operate following the principles of 
programme-based approaches (PBAs) but are focused on one specific sector or thematic 
area, such as health or governance. 
Tied aid: Is defined as development assistance provided under the condition that certain 
goods and services are purchased from firms in the donor country, or otherwise directly 
involve donor country stakeholders. 
Transaction costs: Aid transaction costs are the costs which allow an aid transaction to 
take place but which add nothing to the actual value of that transaction. These include: i) 
Search costs: the costs necessary for partner country governments and potential donors to 
identify appropriate development partners, projects or programmes; ii) Bargaining and 
decision costs: the costs of negotiating and agreeing financing agreements for projects and 
other operations; iii) Policing and enforcement costs: the costs to partner country 
governments of fulfilling requirements for project execution and monitoring and to donor 
agencies of supervising adherence to project and programme conditions and of 
undertaking corrective actions where necessary. 
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